


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First Institute of Education Inaugurated

93SE0057A Rangoon *THE WORKING PEOPLE'S DAILY* in English 18 Nov 92 pp 1, 7

[Text] Yangon, 17 Nov—"The opening of the Mandalay Institute of Education will enable teachers of Basic Education Department in Kachin, Chin and Shan States and Mandalay, Sagaing and Magway Divisions to obtain B Ed degree without much difficulty."

This was mentioned by Minister for Education Col Pe Thein at the ceremony to open the Mandalay Institute of Education held in Mandalay at 3.33 pm yesterday.

Minister Col Pe Thein went on to say that by opening the Mandalay Institute of Education, it has opened a new chapter not only in the history of education of Myanmar but also that of Teachers Training Institutions. He said that as the State has opened a new sector of education so also Mandalay Division was to take pride in it.

He pointed out that the opening of new universities, colleges and institutes in various states and divisions during the time of the State Law and Order Restoration Council were like huge flowers blossoming forth out of the good-will placed by the Government. He said that now, not only the Institute of Technology but also the Institute of Education was opened in Mandalay which could bring about development in the education sector in the future and was a very pleasing and encouraging matter.

He mentioned that Mandalay City had a good historical tradition of being the seat of Myanma culture and customs, arts, literature and where Sasana flourishes and the opening of the Institute of Education has made Mandalay shine more brilliantly with the light of education.

He then elaborated on the aims and objectives of the Institute of Education and spoke of the need for all to make concerted efforts in training the teachers in such a way that they would become good and noble teachers; bring about new teaching techniques which would assist the education sphere of Myanmar Naing-Ngan; and enable research and innovation activities to be carried out in practice.

In conclusion, he thanked the Chairman and Members of the Division Law and Order Restoration Council who gave guidance and helped in the emergence of the Mandalay Institute of Education, the Chairman of the Mandalay Division Law and Order Restoration Council Chairman Commander of the Central Command and all those [who] made it possible for the opening of the Institute.

Head of Department of the Mandalay Institute of Education U Ye Myint formally opened the new institute by cutting a ribbon.

Commander of the Central Command Brig-Gen Kyaw Than also delivered an address on the occasion.

Also present on the occasion were Deputy Commander of the Central Command Col Aung Khin, Secretary of the Mandalay Division Law and Order Restoration Council

Lt-Col Aung Chit, Director-General of the Higher Education Department U Maung Maung Than, Director-General of the Basic Education Department U Tin Pe and rectors and professors of Universities and Institutes in Mandalay and officials of the Ministry of Education.—MNA

KNU Criticizes Rangoon Peace Proposal

93SE0053B Bangkok *BANGKOK POST* in English 16 Nov 92 p 6

[Article: "KNU Says Rangoon Peace Proposal 'Lies'"]

[Text] Manerplaw (Reuter)—The leader of the decades-long struggle against Rangoon for autonomy for the Christian Karen minority says Burma's ruling junta lies when it talks about halting military operations against them.

"The civil war has never for a minute halted," General Bo Mya, president of the Karen National United (KNU), told reporters at his Manerplaw headquarters over the weekend.

Rangoon had recently deployed at least six battalions of fresh troops close to the north and south perimeters of his headquarters on the banks of the River Moei inside Burma, he said.

"Three battalions (a total of 1,200 men) are now at Notha, 20 km (12 miles) to the south, and three battalions at Kamamuang of Pa-Pun district merely one day's walk from here," Bo Mya said.

The rebel leader and Burmese civilians allied with him since the Rangoon generals seized direct power in 1988 said the junta, called the State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC), had deployed 10,000 fresh troops to its eastern border areas for the annual dry-season offensive against the ethnic minorities.

The Karen are the most powerful of a dozen ethnic minority groups that have been seeking autonomy from Rangoon virtually from the time Burma won independence from British colonial rule in 1948.

"Even though the SLORC has declared the halt of hostilities, the civil war has never for a minute halted," the stocky, 65-year-old Karen general said. "They attack KNU positions all the time and force the people to SLORC areas... The military junta always lies and they keep lying.

"The SLORC declared the halt of military operations merely to avoid the strong criticism from foreign countries and for propaganda purpose."

Bo Mya said government troops had overrun three KNU camps since October, when heavy fighting resumed as the rains diminished.

Burmese troops are poised to capture the KNU's Seventh Brigade headquarters at Tawoohta, 100 km south of Manerplaw, where 600 Karen soldiers had been locked in fighting with 3,000 Burmese attackers, the defenders said.

At least 12 Karen fighters have been killed so far in this battle.

Tawoohta camp came under heavy mortar attack when Reuters visited on Saturday afternoon.

Karen soldiers and Thai officials monitoring the fighting from across the Moei said most of the Karen fighters had abandoned the camp and only a handful of soldiers were left behind at their mortar posts.

The Thais said they expected that the Karen would abandon this camp entirely within one or two days.

The Karen general, who has been fighting his Burmese enemies since 1948, said he was confident that his 20,000 fighters could withstand this year's government offensive.

He said he had received assurances from a senior Thai official that his neighbours over the Moei would not allow Burmese to cross the border to attack them from the rear.

"I am quite confident that we can defend Manerplaw and Kaw-moo-ra (the Karen's second biggest camp, south of Manerplaw)," he said.

Burmese troops on many occasions in past years have crossed into Thailand to attack the Karen from the rear because rough mountains and minefields block them from making a frontal infantry assault on either Manerplaw or Kaw-moo-ra.

"We will protect Manerplaw at all costs," Mahn Sha, personal secretary to the KNU leader, said. "The Karen have been fighting with Burma since General Bo Mya had only one rifle and five bullets. Now we have weapons many thousands times more than then. I am confident we can hold our camp."

Air Strikes

Manerplaw was a ghost town at the end of last year's offensive after Burmese launched air strikes and heavy artillery and mortar barrages on the camp. Scores of people were killed and wounded.

The Karen have built five cement and rock bunkers 20 metres long and three metres (nine feet) deep to deal with air strikes.

"These bunkers can withstand half a ton of bomb," Mahn Sha said.

The Rangoon government declared the suspension of military operations when the dry season ended last April.

Rangoon last week said 200 of its soldiers were killed during the past three months, but General Bo Mya said more than 500 Burmese soldiers were killed while his troops lost merely 30.

"The SLORC always lies and they continue to lie to the world about the national convention," he said. "The military dictatorship has no right to hold a national convention."

The military junta, which put down a nationwide uprising for democracy in 1988 and later refused to honour the results of a parliamentary election it lost, is planning a national convention for January to draft a constitution.

"This convention benefits no one but is to firm up the SLORC's position," Bo Mya said.

Agriculture Ministry Reports Increase in Exports

93SE0056A Rangoon *THE WORKING PEOPLE'S DAILY* in English 4 Dec 92 p 7

[Text] Yangon, 13 Nov—The Ministry of Agriculture has exported goods valued at K23.91 million within the first six-month period, surpassing the target value of K23.4 million set by the State.

This was said by the Minister for Agriculture Maj-Gen Myint Aung at the 1992-93 biannual meeting on farm sector of the Ministry of Agriculture held for the second day at the Myanmar Agriculture Service this morning.

He said it has been estimated to export another K23.4 million worth farm produce within next six months.

He called on the personnel at different levels to carry out their tasks with confidence to achieve success, as they have been given management rights.

He was speaking at the second-day meeting of the 1992-93 biannual meeting of the Ministry of Agriculture held at the Myanmar Agriculture Service head office this morning.

Paddy has now been grown on 12.2 million acres of the targeted 12.5 million acres.

The Minister said as the meeting has decided to grow over 210,000 acres of double cropping, over 130,000 acres of mayin paddy, over 17,000 acres of ratooning and over 10,000 acres of late paddy, totalling more than 378,000 acres, total cultivated acreage by the end of the season will be more than 12.6 million acres, surpassing the target by 100,000 acres more.

The estimated production of paddy for this year is 700 million baskets and the target cultivation acreage is 12.5 million acres.

The Minister spoke of the need for raising the quality of some export crops, in addition to quantity.—MNA

Paddy Production Targeted at 700 Million Baskets

93SE0056B Rangoon *THE WORKING PEOPLE'S DAILY* in English 13 Nov 92 pp 12, 6

[Text] Yangon, 21 Nov—"Though new crop of paddy is put on sale there's stiff price of rice these days and this is because of restrictions and prohibitions in some regions," said Secretary-2 of the State Law and Order Restoration Council Maj-Gen Tin Oo in his meeting with the chairmen and members of Division, District and Township Law and Order Restoration Councils at Shwewahtun Hall in Bago today.

He was accompanied by Deputy Minister for Cooperatives U Than Aung and officials concerned of the Ministry of Trade and No 2 Joint Venture Corporation.

He was welcomed on arrival at Bago by Deputy Minister for Religious Affairs U Kyaw Aye and officials concerned.

Secretary-2 spoke on the needs for paddy purchase, transport and milling, as well as city development. He said that it is estimated that 700 million baskets of paddy will be produced, because of good weather, as targeted by the State this year.

He laid stress on smooth transportation and free trading of paddy pointing out that it will bring down prices.

The Ministry of Trade, he said, has to distribute rice to service personnel and organizations and so the ministry has to purchase the paddy needed.

He also cautioned to trade paddy with relevant prices so that consumers are also able to buy rice with relevant prices.

The authorities concerned, he said, have to make arrangements for smooth paddy purchase, transport and milling.

Though free trade of paddy among townships and regions is allowed, he said, alleged marketing must be prohibited.

He also called for efforts to carry out city development saying that tourists usually visit Bago after visiting Yangon.

For general renovation of earthquake-hit historic pagodas in Taungoo, he said, cash donations have to be collected and he called for discussion of the renovation work.

He urged the personnel to realize the short-term and long-term economic plans of the forthcoming fiscal 1993-94 and to make preparations beforehand.

Deputy Minister for Co-operatives U Than Aung then explained the paddy purchase and transport saying that Ministries of Trade and Co-operatives and No 2 Joint Venture Corporation will purchase paddy with relevant prices.

Deputy Minister for Religious Affairs U Kyaw Aye also explained the plans for general renovation of earthquake-hit pagodas in Taungoo.

Officials concerned presented reports on general matters followed by the concluding remarks of the Secretary-2.

The Secretary-2 then inspected the excavation of Hanthawady Old Palace site.

He paid obeisance to State Sangha Maha Nayaka Committee Chairman Agga Maha Pandita Abhidhaja Maha Ratha Guru Abhidhaja Agga Maha Saddhamma Jotika Bago Myoma Sayadawgyi.

He then proceeded to Hlegu Township Law and Order Restoration Council office, met officials concerned and delivered suggestions on paddy purchase, transport and milling.—MNA

SLORC Calls for Removal of Rice Price Restrictions

93SE0056C Rangoon *THE WORKING PEOPLE'S DAILY* in English 22 Nov 92 pp 1, 6

[Text] Yangon, 12 Nov—It is in the most critical phase of the time for agricultural supervisory committees and peasants to make greater strides, in harmony and unison, for the targeted production of 700 million baskets of paddy.

This was said by Minister for Agriculture Maj-Gen Myint Aung in his address to the 1992-93 first biannual meeting on the agriculture sector of the Ministry of Agriculture held this morning at the Myanmar Agriculture Service head office.

The Minister said 40 per cent of the National Product is turning out from the agriculture sector.

He reminded of the State Law and Order Restoration Council Chairman General Than Shwe's notification to the entire nation that paddy, being designated as the State's major crop, should be produced with greater momentum.

The three objectives of the Ministry, he said, are to produce surplus paddy, to ensure adequacy of edible oil, and to boost the production of industrial crops and farm crops.

The harvest of pre-monsoon paddy crop has been completed, the harvest of monsoon crop has begun, the late-monsoon crop has been cultivated, muyen paddy is being planted and preparations are being made to grow double cropping, the Minister explained.

He went on to explain that the target cultivation of paddy is 12.6 million acres, and by the end of October, 12.2 million acres of paddy has been cultivated and 400,000 acres remain to be cultivated.

He urged the officials to make preparations for the 1993-94 target production of 800 million baskets, saying the application of new cultivation techniques, availability of water and construction of dams are tasks to be taken up in the coming open season.

Although the production of crops such as sesamum, sunflower, jute, monsoon long-staple cotton, pesinngon, etc., has surpassed the targets, maize, groundnut and long staple cotton are still short of targeted cultivation acreage, the Minister pointed out.

Now, individuals who have been granted to engage in the agriculture and livestock breeding activities on virgin and fallow land, have begun their services. The total area of virgin and fallow land allocated for the services is 48,258 acres.

He also spoke of export matters. Then discussions followed.

The meeting will continue tomorrow.—MNA

SLORC Accused of Ignoring Narcotics Menace*93SE0058B Bangkok THE NATION in English
18 Nov 92 p A4*

[Article by Yindee Lertcharoenchok]

[Text] A well-known Burmese author who fled to the Thai-Burmese border after being released from six months in Rangoon's Insein jail has accused the military junta of turning a blind eye to poppy cultivation and the soaring number of heroin addicts in the capital.

He also blamed the ruling State Law and Order Restoration Council (Slorc) of encouraging the trafficking of illicit drugs to the world market and alleged that its well-publicized shows of narcotics destruction were faked.

Mahn Nyunt Maung, better known to his readers as Maung Sin Kye, during an interview at his hiding place, described a grim picture of widespread heroin availability and addiction in Rangoon.

The former political prisoner said the Burmese military rulers have tolerated and encouraged heroin sales in Rangoon since they brutally put down a popular uprising in 1988.

The move, he said, was aimed at diverting the students' attention from politics.

"The availability of heroin at that time was so great that one could easily buy it at [any street] kiosk at a bargain price," he said.

Today, one can buy heroin without having to search for it and the state of drug addiction has become "so grisly that addicts are not only injecting into their arms and legs, but also their neck veins," he said.

Jail inmates as well have access to drugs, the Karen author added.

He said he believed UN anti-narcotics agencies might not be aware just how easy it is to obtain heroin in Rangoon as they are familiar only with Slorc's arranged displays of narcotics destruction.

"The UN and international anti-narcotics agencies are not allowed [independent] visits to poppy growing areas.

"They can only witness what Slorc is willing to let them see," he said.

Slorc, he added, has neither enforced existing laws nor tried to suppress drug trafficking and sales in Rangoon, and even addicts, when they are tested, can easily avoid penalty by bribing officials to obtain a drugs-free certificate.

"Those young addicts who are sent to Wet Hti Kan rehabilitation centre in Prome often come out with an official document permitting them to obtain a certain amount of the drug for their daily consumption," Mahn Nyunt Maung said.

The 59-year-old author, who is well-known for his book on Karen life and culture, said poppy production in north-eastern Burma, especially in the Shan State, and drug trafficking is being carried out with the consent of the Burmese authorities.

"If Slorc is really serious about drug suppression, how come opium production is not decreasing," he asked.

He accused Slorc of thriving on narcotics proceeds and said its power and political stability rely mainly on the heroin economy.

Mahn Nyunt Maung's criticism came at a time when Slorc is urging the United States to restore financial aid to Burma for drug suppression.

Washington suspended the aid after the brutal military crackdown on pro-democracy demonstrations in 1988.

Last month, a senior Thai narcotics official urged countries that seize the assets of convicted drug traffickers to channel the money back to Burma to support its narcotics eradication programme.

Opium production in Burma has soared from about 300 tonnes yearly before 1988 to about 2,300 tonnes.

Rangoon has repeatedly rejected the figure as an exaggeration and claimed that its unilateral drug suppression and eradication programme was a success.

Mahn Nyunt Maung is among hundreds of political prisoners who have been pardoned since Slorc's amnesty Declaration No 11/92 on April 24.

He was arrested on Oct 10, 1991 for his strong criticism of Slorc's killing and torture of Karen civilians in the Irrawaddy Delta.

He said after his release from jail he was followed by Burmese Military Intelligence and placed under surveillance.

He fled Rangoon in early September and arrived at the Karen anti-government headquarters in Manerplaw on the Thai-Burmese border nearly two weeks later.

Mahn Nyunt Muang was general secretary of the Union Karen League until it merged with the League for Democracy and Peace of former prime minister U Nu.

Corruption Turns Generals Into Millionaires*93SE0058A Bangkok BANGKOK POST in English
18 Nov 92 p 8*

[Text] Rangoon (AFP)—Burma's ruling generals are at the centre of a web of corruption that has turned them into dollar millionaires, according to residents here and Burmese businessmen who have had to deal with them.

And with plans to increase the army from 300,000 to 500,000 men by 2000, the increasingly wealthy generals are determined to remain in power for the foreseeable future, observers say.

Although the economy lies in tatters, with the local currency all but worthless, residents say the junta leaders,

under their official title of the State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC), continue to amass fortunes and the ordinary soldier has been turned into an elite class.

While a Burmese private receives only a meagre monthly salary, he has special housing, special shops and special transport, and his family is looked after by the government.

Gen Than Shwe, the prime minister and official leader of the junta, has allegedly put together a fortune by manipulating the system.

Maj-Gen Khin Nyunt, according to Burmese businessmen who have dealt with the head of the country's military intelligence, is involved in almost every major business project and has accepted millions of dollars in kickbacks.

Attempts by AFP to contact Khin Nyunt and other junta leaders about the allegations went unanswered.

"The leadership is lining its own pockets by accepting bribes to favour certain businessmen. Many of them have salted their money away in foreign banks in Singapore and Switzerland. Corruption is everywhere," said one successful Burmese businessman who if he allowed his name to be published would find himself in Insein prison.

He admitted that he had paid massive bribes to military leaders to ensure several lucrative contracts.

Residents say it is the fear of the junta that has allowed corruption to flourish unchallenged.

Political opposition has been crushed, with opponents either in jail, in hiding or cowed into submission by what residents here describe as a brutal campaign of repression.

The junta has complete control and a daily diet of propaganda from state-run radio, television and newspapers is dulling the minds of the people, opponents claim.

What little anti-government news is heard, mostly from the British Broadcasting Corporation, is quickly denounced by Khin Nyunt.

The crumbling economy revolves around corruption with almost everyone being forced to play the black market to survive, and government officials admit privately that the generals will never carry out a serious campaign to end it.

The Bureau of Special Investigation, set up to probe corruption among government workers, catches only the people at the bottom of the chain.

"They are only allowed to go so high up the ladder. The generals and businessmen at the heart of the corruption are untouchable," said a bank clerk who has spent six months in Insein prison after being caught fiddling money.

As the corruption continues unabated, spying has become one of the country's biggest growth industries, creating a feeling of paranoia among the people.

"You very rarely see more than three people sitting together in one of the hundreds of tea houses scattered

around the city. People are convinced that with three there is a chance that none of them work for military intelligence," one resident said.

"But if you increase the group to five they reckon the odds of an informer being amongst them is almost certain," the resident added.

Taxi drivers who hang around outside the city's hotels, illegally changing money and trying to buy whiskey and cigarettes from tourists, are only allowed to operate on condition they pass on information to military intelligence (MI).

"When MI ask us where we took certain tourists, who they saw, of course, we tell them. If we didn't we would be put out of business right away," confided one taxi driver who has been working the hotels for more than 15 years.

Terrorists Captured Small Army Camp

93SE0057B Rangoon *THE WORKING PEOPLE'S DAILY* in English 12 Nov 92 pp 12, 7

[Text] Yangon, 11 Nov—The State Law and Order Restoration Council on 24 April 1992 under its Declaration No 11/92 declared that depending on the general situation of the country, it will, in respect of the convening of the National Convention, meet and co-ordinate with the leaders of the Hluttaw Representatives of the political parties existing lawfully and independent Hluttaw Representatives and that it will convene the National Convention within six months in order to lay down the basic principles for the drafting of a firm and stable Constitution.

Then again on 28 April a statement was made to the effect that the military offensives in Kayin State would be stopped as a gesture of goodwill to expedite attainment of amity among all national races for national unity and with a view to strengthening national solidarity. The Tatmadaw columns from the military offensive areas were also withdrawn.

Thus with the objective of holding a national convention successfully for laying down the basic principles for the drafting of a firm Constitution in view of the future of the country, the military offensives were halted in Kayin State. The KNU [Karen National Union] terrorists taking advantage of this captured two small Tatmadaw camps on the sly with malicious intent.

The combined strength of about 500 KNU terrorists and DAB [Democratic Alliance of Burma] terrorists, attacked the Htimukhi camp in the Southern Command area on 25 July 1992. Although the Tatmadawmen put up a stiff resistance with much valour and bravery, the camp fell. In the battle, 23 Tatmadawmen including two officers sacrificed their lives for the country, 11 Tatmadawmen were found missing and 11 Tatmadawmen including one officer were wounded. Eight were killed and 23 were wounded from the terrorist side.

The KNU terrorists, after attacking the Htimukhi camp, joined up on 1 September 1992, and with a strength of

about 400 terrorists attacked Tatmadaw camps in Hweponglao region in the Eastern Command area. In the battles which took place 44 Tatmadawmen including three officers either fell in the battles or reported missing.

Although the Tatmadaw had halted military offensives, it still had the right to defend itself and beginning from 1 August 1992, it started launching counter offensives in Htimukhi region in the Southern Command area and fierce battles took place on Pawmuthe mountain range and Palatkho mountain range. The terrorists not only put a strong defensive with full strength on the hills but were also given administrative support from the Sawhta camp on the border region. Due to this the Tatmadaw columns bravely attacked and captured the Sawhta Camp on 6 October 1992 and Point 1629 on 18 October 1992, respectively.

In the Sawhta battle, 25 terrorists were captured dead and 10 assorted arms, one Toyota car, one bulldozer, one Honda motorcycle, one engine, one power generator and quantities of sawn timber were seized by the Tatmadaw. Altogether 143 Tatmadawmen including one officer sacrificed their lives for the country and 77 Tatmadawmen including one officer were wounded.

The KNU terrorists who were defending the Htimukhi, Pawmuthe and Palatkho mountain range, realizing that the situation was not very favourable started retreating. The Tatmadaw columns, together with Tatmadaw (Air) recaptured Htimukhi, Palatkho mountain ranges and the entire Sade region on 6 November 1992. In the offensives launched to recapture Htimukhi region, 255 engagements took place and 142 terrorists were killed and 462 were wounded, it was reported. Altogether 88 Tatmadawmen,

including three officers gave up their lives for the country and 437 Tatmadawmen including 15 officers were wounded.

Beginning from 13 September 1992, the Tatmadaw launched military offensives against the camps in the Hweponglao region in the Eastern Command area. On 20 September, the terrorists retreated from Hweponglao region. As the terrorists numbering about 300 had a strong foothold on Dawtakhet mountain range near Point 3222, the Tatmadaw columns had to march and attack the terrorists. A total of 19 engagements took place and on 2 November, the Tatmadaw columns were able to attack and captured all the stronghold camps of the terrorists.

The Tatmadaw in launching offensives against the terrorist camps in Hweponglao and Dawtakhet mountain range encountered with the terrorists in 25 engagements and captured 25 terrorists dead and seized 74 assorted arms, 19,501 rounds of ammunition, 278 shells for heavy weapons and 424 assorted mines.

The KNU, DAB and KNPP [Karen National Progressive Party] terrorists took for granted that the State Law and Order Restoration Council, in stopping military offensives as a gesture of goodwill with the view of attaining amity among all the national races for national unity and for forging national solidarity, the Tatmadaw had no military strength to attack and that the Government's offer for peace was a sign that it was in tight corner. The terrorists had a wrong conception on the true attitude of the State Law and Order Restoration Council and took advantage with a malicious intent and launched offensives, but the Tatmadaw launched fierce counter offensives and as a result the terrorists suffered heavy casualties and had to run away in disarray to the border area. MNA

Foreign Use of Religion for Political Ends Criticized

93SE0039B Vientiane ALOUN MAI in Lao
No 3, May-Jun 92 pp 28-30

[Article by Kong Song: "Religion and Morality"]

[Excerpts] We need many things. Among these a belief in religion is essential. It provides a conscience for the people of every country. [passage omitted]

However if we look in other areas, we see that religion has many drawbacks such as: it draws the human spirit toward the Buddhist scriptures and immortality, and sometimes it leads to dreaming and a lack of creativity. Sometimes it has been used to deceive the people, and sometimes it has resisted science also. [passage omitted]

During the present period it has played a role in the movement for political progress. Many religious organizations have become political parties such as the Christian Democratic Party, the Islamic Socialist Party, the Christian Youth Organization, etc. On many occasions religious organizations have demanded, begged for, and prayed for peace and disarmament. In some countries at turning points religion has been a more positive influence on the people than the party in power as could be seen during the crises in the Eastern European countries when religion played this role prominently.

In our country Buddhism has been like the conscience of the Lao people since ancient times. It has trained the people to be modest, polite, honest, generous and peace-loving. The Lao people consider Buddhism to be their national religion. [passage omitted] It is not just the lowland Lao who believe in Buddhism, other ethnic groups such as the Souai, the Khamou, the Laven, the Phou Noi and the Hmong include some who also believe in Buddhism. [passage omitted]

The principles of Buddhism are generally good and beneficial to the Lao people. However in fact some people and groups have used religion for bad purposes especially during the period when relations with other countries were being expanded and after our government put into effect a constitution and various laws which gave the religions in Laos more freedom of belief and more freedom for activities - for example, praying for peace, giving alms, and performing the Buddhist ceremonies of Thotkathin and Thotphapa which draw Buddhists from neighboring countries to ours. The problem here has been that if we examine the religious ceremonies and activities performed to increase the understanding between Buddhists, they are generally fine, but sometimes they are not in keeping with international relations or, even worse, sometimes people take advantage and use them to conduct activities for bad purposes which are unpopular with the villagers and cause disorder in the administration of society. At present the activities of other religions such as the Catholic, the Protestant, and the Bahai are increasing in our country. Religious organizations not associated with governments and acting as charitable foundations have been active in the economic sphere and in many areas of development. This has been very beneficial for the multiethnic people of

some villages in distant and secluded areas. But at the same time the people have been unhappy with some individuals who have provided this help with ulterior motives and have made statements which bothered the people such as: "Buddhism just asks for money from the people while our religion brings money and goods to the people." In this regard we must understand that making merit and giving alms represent devotion for Buddhism and the belief of the people in Buddhism. If the people are happy in their belief, they will not have any regrets about the goods or money they donate. They only want to make merit. But if a religion brings money which was given because of religious beliefs and uses it as propaganda to deceive the people and make them abandon their religion and adopt the other religion, then it can be said that this not only violates the principles of morality and causes divisions among the religions but also violates the constitution of the LPDR [Lao People's Democratic Republic]. Some religions may have a great deal of money, but where does this money come from? If it is not from contributions, is someone providing support behind the scenes?

Another thing which we should watch for is that there are some individuals providing assistance in the distant countryside who have said that: "the Lao Government is not interested in helping the poor villagers in the countryside; only my group, a religious organization for helping poor people, is interested." Now the Lao who have been trained in the Law and the Constitution are very alert - they can see that the propaganda mentioned above violates Article 9 of the Constitution of the LPDR. [passage omitted]

Our nation has a clearly defined political system, and it has a constitution and laws which guarantee the rights of the multiethnic people. These rights include the right to believe or not believe in religion. The people are aware and know what is right and what is false and self-serving. Therefore they are not afraid to criticize those things which are either openly or secretly bad. In addition, public opinion is demanding that the responsible officials improve the system so that there is unity between central authority and the localities with regard to receiving foreign assistance especially from organizations not affiliated with governments, that detailed regulations be adopted, and that religious relationships be made correct according to the laws and the Constitution already in effect.

Champassak Security on 'Imperialist Subversion'

93SE0039C Vientiane PASASON in Lao 29 Sep 92 p 2

[Report by Khamla Daodonkhong: "Champassak Province Makes Progress in Public Security Work"]

[Excerpts] In July 1992 a meeting of PKS [Public Security Force] cadres from throughout Champassak Province was held. [passage omitted] The headquarters committee for the province PKS presented a document from the committee for public security of central authority concerning resistance to the strategy for peaceful change of the imperialists and other enemy forces being used against Laos in many areas and provinces. Each section was about the change in strategy for resisting the slander of the new system and the economic leadership of the party and state

and for opposing the propaganda used to cause confusion among the cadres and people concerning culture and society and to weaken our great national culture. [passage omitted]

Journal Views Subversive Threats to Party

93SE0039A *Vientiane ALOUN MAI in Lao*
No 3, May-June 92 pp 2-9

[Unsigned Theoretical Journal Article: "Increase Ideological Work in the New Era"]

[Excerpts] Since the first day of the revolution our party has always maintained that ideological work was important for building the party [passage omitted]

When we look back on the ideological and political work done in the past, we see that the ideological work played an important part in and provided the basis for the common victory of the entire party and entire people. This victory was achieved on the basis of the propaganda and the training provided the rank and file of cadres and party members which raised their class consciousness and leadership qualities, assured stability and political strength for the nation, assured that the leadership role of the party was steadily increased, and unified the party in ideology, outlook, and leadership. [passage omitted]

In the past although we have provided training and propaganda in many forms and at many levels, nevertheless it can be seen that the understanding of the lines, plans, and policies of the party and laws of the state have not been thoroughly understood. The forces which do the ideological work do not coordinate closely on content, outline, and method; they have not changed with the status and growth of the economy and society. The system for ideological work is weak from top to bottom. The party committee at all levels has failed to lead the ideological work directly; it has not considered ideology to be the work of the front lines. [passage omitted]

Now and in the future ideological work is important and necessary for maintaining the important features of the revolution in our country. [passage omitted]

At present we are faced with the danger of warfare in the form of the peaceful change of the imperialists. Since the collapse of the socialist countries in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, the imperialists and the enemy forces have concentrated all their forces for a fierce attack on those countries which still hold fast to socialism. They are determined to conduct an ideological and political war and create opposition to socialism within the remaining socialist countries. In addition they are spreading false and slanderous propaganda attacking Marxism-Leninism and socialism. They are promoting the ideology of liberal democracy devoid of [democratic] centralism. They disseminate and support the philosophy of many groups and parties. They encourage what is called "human rights." They hope to completely eliminate the leadership role of the Communist Party and the socialist system from the world.

This situation conflicts seriously with the ideology of our cadres, [party] members, and people. Therefore if our ideological work is not timely, intelligent and effective in countering this psychological warfare, it will create discouragement or even misunderstanding and doubt about the policies of the party. In the end this would mean that our policies could not be carried out effectively.

The principle lesson of the past for the Communist Party and the workers of the world is that in the countries of Eastern Europe and in the Soviet Union when ideological work was neglected, the workers and the people abandoned the leadership role of the party, eliminated the party and completely repudiated Marxism-Leninism, socialism and the science which had endured and expanded for more than 70 years. They abandoned the class struggle and the dictatorship of the proletariat. They refused to recognize the accomplishments of the socialist system. [passage omitted]

POLITICAL

BN Accepts Sabah Unity Party Challenge To Debate

93SE0064A Kuala Lumpur BERITA HARIAN
in Malay 16 Nov 92 p 2

[Text] National Front (BN) component parties in Sabah are willing to debate the Sabah United Party (PBS) on the 20 Points, which have now been made an issue.

According to National Front sources, many party leaders are willing to have a debate to present the truth about the 20 Points that PBS leaders have been distorting.

Karim Ghani, chief of information for Sabah UMNO [United Malays National Organization], said Sabah UMNO has many high-caliber leaders who are ready to discuss these matters at any time.

"We are willing and are waiting for the PBS for a decision and a date for the debate," he said.

He said Sabah UMNO leaders are confident that they can present the truth about the 20 Points, which the PBS is using as a political issue.

He said this as a comment on Deputy Prime Minister Ghafar Baba's statement yesterday that the Sabah BN will debate the PBS on the 20 Points, as the PBS requested.

In his report, Ghafar said the proposed debate will not be between UMNO and the PBS alone, because BN component parties in Sabah, such as USNO [United Sabah National Organization], LDP [Liberal Democratic Party], and AKAR [People's Justice Movement], want to participate.

Meanwhile, Mohd. Shafie Abdal, chairman of Sabah UMNO Youth, said Sabah UMNO Youth remains ready to debate any PBS leader on these issues.

He said the debate will help the people of Sabah to evaluate for themselves the propaganda promulgated by the PBS for the purpose of separating Sabah from Malaysia.

He said PBS insistence on exemption of Dr. Jeffrey Kitingan from the ISA [Internal Security Act] is impractical and shows the party has no confidence in its present leadership.

AKAR Secretary-General Ronald Kiantdee said he is willing for a debate and expects it will present the truth.

Sabah Chief Minister Datuk Joseph Pairin Kitingan says he is willing to debate any Central Government leader on the 20 Points and on any other issue. He proposes that the debate be broadcast live on television.

He said he wants an opportunity to select the moderator, however.

MILITARY

Defense Department Considers Buying MiG-29's

93SE0063A Kuala Lumpur BERITA HARIAN
in Malay 19 Nov 92 p 5

[Text] Based on a study made by a team of senior Department of Defense officials and experts in aircraft engineering and control who recently visited Russia and India, the government believes it will be appropriate to buy MiG-29 aircraft.

Deputy Minister of Defense Datuk Wan Abu Bakar Wan Mohamad said several subjects need to be taken up with Russia before a purchase is made, however. These subjects include construction of repair facilities and the manufacture of spare parts.

"The Ministry of Defense will ensure that the acquisition of MiG-29's is performed in the best possible way and that supplying of spare parts is included in the contract," he said as he wound up a parliamentary debate on the ministry's part of the National Budget.

Wan Abu Bakar said another rationale for buying the planes is that aircraft in current use are too old and that the ministry needs to improve defense capabilities.

He said the government will discuss a contract for MiG-29 purchases with parties appointed by the Russian Government.

"So far, all discussions have been about technical aspects, spare parts assistance, and training and have been conducted with the Russian Embassy and the Defense Export Council (GED), which makes the planes," he said.

On the subject of Hawk aircraft bought by the Royal Malaysian Air Force (TUDM), he said the Hawks for the TUDM were based on unique specifications.

"The Hawks have special features that probably will not be found on the planes to be supplied to Indonesia and Korea," he said in response to charges made by Ilani Ishak (Spirit of '46, Kota Bharu) and Dr. Kua Kia Soong (Democratic Action Party, Petaling Jaya).

ECONOMIC

MITI Overhaul, Industrial Ties With Vietnam

93SE0062B Kuala Lumpur UTUSAN MALAYSIA
in Malay 16 Nov 92 p 21

[Text] Kuala Kangsar, 15 Nov—Beginning next year, the Ministry of International Trade and Industry [MITI] will ensure that all trade and industrial missions overseas are combined for the sake of coordinating investment promotion and marketing.

Minister Datuk Sri Rafidah Aziz said things will not be done as in the past, when investment openings in Malaysia were promoted without giving thought to market opportunities in the countries visited by the missions.

He said she had talked with officials involved about updating all future trade promotion missions going overseas.

She said MITI wants to see to it that all trade created will bring in elements of investment with potential for continuous expansion and increased marketing and trade.

In a meeting with reporters yesterday after inaugurating a Women's Day commemoration in Kuala Kangsar District, Rafidah said all MIDA [Malaysian Industrial Development Authority] and Trade Commission officers overseas will be directed to implement the new, updated format to make our national industrial strategy more effective.

"Next year, MITI will also hold several large-scale exhibitions, including one in Teejon, Korea, and the cabinet has given approval to MITI to build a pavilion that symbolizes Malaysia's success," she said.

Rafidah also announced that the Vietnamese Government has formed a technical committee and a group to provide facilities in a free trade zone in Vietnam. Initially, these groups are being financed by the Malaysian Alliance of South-South Associations (MASA).

She said Vietnam has offered two locations from which to select, one in Danang and the other in Northern Vietnam, and MITI will study them from the aspect of geology and suitability for industry and associated facilities.

"I have asked that a study be made immediately; but because the project will be a very large and costly one, research needs to be done before creating such a zone," she said.

Rafidah called attention to the many other matters that need to be resolved with the Vietnamese Government, primarily land prices and how long land can be used. MITI has asked Vietnam to make a list of its requirements.

Deputy Minister Says 18,000 Scientists Needed

93SE0062A Kuala Lumpur BERITA HARIAN
in Malay 15 Nov 92 p 5

[Text] Sekudai—Malaysia needs at least 18,000 scientists by the year 2000 to fulfill the 2020 Plan's goal for making Malaysia a developed country.

Deputy Minister for Science, Technology, and Environment Peter Chin said Malaysia now has only 7,000 scientists and researchers and less than 200 with rank of professor.

"The ministry considers this shortage of scientists to be a serious problem that should be resolved immediately, before the year 2000," he told reporters yesterday after inaugurating the General Assembly and Science Conference of the Malaysian Electron Microscopy Association at the Malaysian University of Technology (UTM).

Chin said there are only 400 scientists and researchers per million people.

"We need at least 1,000 scientists and researchers per million people in this country.

"That means Malaysia needs at least 18,000 scientists and researchers by the year 2000," he said.

In this connection, he said he will ask the cooperation of other ministries and agencies in resolving the problem as quickly as possible.

"Steps to be taken include finding ways to reattract Malaysian scientists and researchers now working overseas, particularly in the CIS, India, Pakistan, and China," he said.

He said he has asked the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to make a study of the number of Malaysians working overseas as scientists.

"When they renew their passports, they will be given a special form on which they will enter data about their careers and their academic qualifications.

"That will enable us to gather data and identify groups that can be offered work here," he said.

Chin said his ministry will ask for the cooperation of the Public Services Department (JPA) in reviewing the salaries and amenities afforded to scientists and researchers serving as public employees.

"This is to keep them from moving to the private sector, which in turn hurts the effort to create more scientists," he said.

POLITICAL

Analyst Defends Khmer Rouge, Wants Election Delay

93SE0054A Bangkok SIAM RAT SAPDA WICHAN
in Thai 22-28 Nov 92 pp 18, 19

[Interview with Dr. Khien Thirawit by SIAM RAT SAPDA WICHAN reporter; date and place not given]

[Text] [SIAM RAT SAPDA WICHAN] The Khmer Rouge has rejected the proposals made at the Beijing conference and indicated that there may be another war.

[Khien] Their demands were a reaffirmation of their previous demands. The Khmer Rouge does not believe that the various factions are adhering strictly to the Paris accords. That is, they think that there are still Vietnamese agents in Cambodia. As for control by the UN Transitional Authority in Cambodia, or UNTAC, in the important state organizations, it controls at least five ministries, that is, national defense, security, foreign affairs, finance, and information. They don't think that they have any control over these five ministries. These are the two main reasons behind their demands. As for the matter of Vietnamese soldiers or Vietnamese agents, that is probably true. If the Khmer Rouge charges that there are still Vietnamese troops or agents in Cambodia, they will have to say where those soldiers or agents are. There should be a debate in the Supreme National Council (SNC). If an agreement can't be reached, the president, that is, Prince Sihanouk, will determine whether to conduct an inspection. If an inspection is conducted, UNTAC will have to assemble a mixed team of officials, or it can conduct the inspection itself. This is not specified in the accord or appendixes to the accord. But that is what should be done in practice. But to date, UNTAC has simply denied that charge. To be more exact, it has said that if there are Vietnamese in Cambodia, the Khmer Rouge should reveal their locations. They have not taken this very seriously, with both sides verbally attacking each other. But they should do what I just said. That is, they should discuss the locations. This should be discussed in the SNC. This is what should be done.

Actually, this is not a major issue. UNTAC must take action because of the agreement reached in Paris. And the various appendixes clearly state that it must take action. When there is an issue like this, it must do something in response to the Khmer Rouge proposals. At the very least, it must take some action. I think that if they raise the issue of Vietnamese soldiers at an SNC meeting or some other meeting and say that there are Vietnamese soldiers in a particular town or in a particular regiment or military unit of the Hun Sen faction, then their charge should be investigated. The Hun Sen faction can participate. This would be done openly. Suppose that there really are Vietnamese soldiers or agents in Cambodia, they could then flee. That would be the end of the matter. If they don't find any in one place, they can conduct an inspection somewhere else. If they inspect four or five places and don't find any, I think that the Khmer Rouge will stop making these demands. This is what should be done in actual practice.

However, simply denying this is not correct, because that is tantamount to their saying that they won't adhere to the Paris accord. That is something that concerns foreign troops.

As for their claim that there are large numbers of Vietnamese living there, that is true. It has been charged that the eight Vietnamese who were killed along the bank of the Tonle Sap were killed because they were fishing in a fertile area of theirs. The Khmer Rouge were charged with the killings. But the truth is, no one knows who killed them. But the fact is, there definitely are Vietnamese living in Cambodia. Vietnamese are entering the country without a visa. They simply enter the country and settle down. This is something that the Khmer Rouge are protesting vigorously. The Khmer Rouge are anti-Vietnamese. This is one reason for their popularity among the people. Anyone who kills Vietnamese who have entered the country like that will gain popularity among the Cambodian people. This is more a matter of emotion than reason. Other countries take a dim view of this, but the fact is, Cambodians hate the Vietnamese. Regardless of which Cambodian faction kills the Vietnamese living in that area, even Cambodians under the administration Hun Sen probably support such actions.

I think that this is probably a major issue throughout the country. In my view, this issue should be put on hold until after the election. After the election, consideration should be given to what will be done with the Vietnamese who have settled in Cambodia, which ones will be allowed to continue living there, and which ones should be repatriated to Vietnam. This is the way this should be handled.

As for supervision, they use the English word "control." As for what has been done, they say that they have established a committee to supervise the national bank. This is a very new step. As for other things, foreign affairs matters are still being handled by the apparatus of the Hun Sen government. National defense matters are being handled by UNTAC. But because the Khmer Rouge have refused to lay down their weapons, UNTAC can't control things. As for the mass media, no progress has been made. In view of this, the Khmer Rouge continue to claim that nothing is being done about this. Looking at things from the outside, the Khmer Rouge make an important claim, that is, their forces are still intact. If 70 percent of their forces are disarmed prior to the election, they will lose their bargaining power.

Looking at this fairly, control of the various mechanisms must be carried on simultaneously. The objective is to have an honest and fair election. There can be a neutral atmosphere only if no single faction is allowed to control the election apparatus. The same is true for the various communications bodies and foreign affairs committees.

I think that there are still weaknesses concerning the work of UNTAC. There are still problems, and they [the Khmer Rouge] have valid reasons.

One reason is that some observers have major interests at stake. This includes Thailand, China, and Japan. They are trying to solve the problems. These three countries have

inspected things and found that some of the complaints made by the Khmer Rouge are valid and that there should be some give and take. The question is, what can be done to make UNTAC and the SNC more efficient? This is not within the power of Thailand, China, or Japan. The Japanese Government can't issue orders to Akashi (the head of UNTAC). Even though Akashi is a Japanese, he works for the United Nations. He is the representative of the secretary-general of the United Nations rather than the representative of the Japanese Government.

The problem is, UNTAC is operating under the assumption that the majority of the people oppose the Khmer Rouge. Thus, it is looking for ways to prevent the Khmer Rouge from gaining influence and power. That is why it has done what it has done.

Something that needs to be clarified is the issue of the interests of each faction, including the Hung Sen faction, the Khmer Rouge, and the Vietnamese. This is an important problem today. I think that we need to understand that the interests that they are fighting for are their interests. It's only natural that they will demand as much as they can. If others disregard the accord, they will too. That's only natural. We can't blame them for that. It is UNTAC that is most to blame. It must implement the accord and the appendixes strictly. This is the problem.

[SIAM RAT SAPDA WICHAN] There have been reports that the UN Security Council will pass a resolution to close the Thai-Cambodian border.

[Khien] That is still just a rumor. It still isn't known if the Security Council will pass such a resolution. An important variable is China. What will China do? China has more influence, but we don't know if it is in favor of this. Implementing such an economic measure would punish just one faction, that is, the Khmer Rouge. But I don't think that the problem is serious enough to warrant punishing one faction. Moreover, China sympathizes with the Khmer Rouge. It's not a matter of protecting its interests or defending the Khmer Rouge. They view the problem the same way that Thailand does, and they have a reasonable argument. Thus, they are hesitating, and so it isn't known if such a resolution will be passed.

If I were the Thai Government, the issue really isn't very difficult if we look at Thailand's interests. There are about 30,000 Thais who are engaged in trading activities along the border, and there are companies that are engaged in trade. I don't think that we have to be too concerned about the companies, because they are already rich. Some people think that these companies are benefiting Thailand economically. But I am more concerned about those 30,000 people. They have been supporting themselves from border trade for a long time. If they are seriously affected like that, problems will arise, and the government will probably have to take steps to protect their interests. I don't think that we should blame just the Khmer Rouge. In my view, it is UNTAC that should be blamed.

If view of this, if we don't agree, in my view the best solution is to have the Ministry of Foreign Affairs ask the Chinese ambassador to come discuss matters. We should

ask China to use its power on the UN Security Council. The Chinese ambassador has the power to veto any resolution aimed at punishing a particular faction. But in actual practice, I think that once the other four powers realize that China will veto such a resolution, they will not introduce such a motion. They will try to reach a compromise rather than using that power. The result will be that they won't punish the Khmer Rouge. Instead, the time for improving things, including the work of UNTAC, will be extended. I think that we can ask this by asking the ambassador to come for talks.

Another thing is that our foreign minister can communicate with the Chinese foreign minister in Beijing in any way possible. And a letter can be sent to Thailand's permanent ambassador to the United Nations instructing him to inform China's permanent ambassador to the United Nations that Thailand does not think that the United Nations should pass a resolution imposing economic sanctions. I think that this would achieve results. But we have to take action. If we sit by idly, they might pass a resolution that is contrary to Thailand's interests.

But in my view, the important thing is for us to take action. I would like.... If we think that this is in the interests of the Thai people. In my view, if the Khmer Rouge is wrong and refuses to adhere to the Paris accord, they should be punished. And Thailand should participate. But in this case, I don't think that the Khmer Rouge is the only one at fault.

Suppose that we don't do anything. Suppose that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs does not take any action and that China goes along with the other super powers. There have been reports that a decision will be made next week (22 November). Suppose that they pass a resolution to punish the Khmer Rouge by forcing Thailand to close the border in the Khmer Rouge zone, which is quite a long stretch, in order to stop trading, gemstone mining, and logging activities, that is, in order to stop all economic activities there. I don't think that the Thai Government can announce that it will reject such a resolution. The government and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs will probably have to say as little as possible. If they are compelled to say something, they will have to accept the UN resolution, because Thailand is a member of the United Nations. We will have to accept that resolution. But the question is, How strictly will we adhere to that resolution? We are talking about Thailand's interests. The United Nations will definitely want to station forces along the border inside Thailand. But I don't think that we should allow them to do that. We don't have to agree to that. We don't have to allow foreign troops or UN troops to be stationed on Thai soil. That is our right as a sovereign state. If we agree with the resolution, we can allow them to station soldiers here. But I don't think that Thailand should agree. Because at the present time, they should first take steps to have UNTAC improve its work. But if they pass a resolution, they can carry out their duties. But as for using Thailand, that's for Thailand to decide.

As for prohibiting Thais from engaging in trade and carrying on economic activities there, that is a matter of....

At present, that falls under the power of the ministries of interior and defense. It all depends on how much they do. I don't think that Thailand should use its human resources to monitor activities there. Because from the very beginning, we have been opposed to such a resolution. Whatever we can do is enough. The important thing is that both Thai and foreign reporters will be monitoring our every move. Thailand is an open country. We must find a way to prevent them from tarnishing Thailand's image.

Actually, if an election is held in Cambodia in the present situation, the Khmer Rouge may or may not participate. Based on the data now available, it appears that the faction of Prince Ranariddh has the advantage. They have a good apparatus that would give them the advantage in an election. The Hun Sen faction has been trying to cling to Prince Sihanouk since the very beginning. But they now feel that Prince Ranariddh is keeping him away from them. Thus, Hun Sen is not sure if he will be able to cling to Prince Sihanouk if an election is held. And if he can't that means that he would lose power. Thus, a problem today is that the Hun Sen faction does not want the election to be held now. The Hun Sen faction wants to fight, as does the Khmer Rouge. Thus, whenever fighting breaks out somewhere, it doesn't necessarily mean that it was the Khmer Rouge that started the fight. The Hun Sen faction may have started the fight. You have to look at each point.

The problem is that they are not adhering strictly to the Paris accord. This has led to a situation in which some have an advantage over others on the election field. Because of the interference that has created various conditions in this situation, the potential for the use of force is very great. Thus, the solution is to improve things and make compromises. Both factions, the Khmer Rouge and the Phnom Penh faction, should be allowed to participate. This is the only way out. If force is used, what good would it do to hold an election? After the election, there would still be fighting. The country would still be divided into factions.

[SIAM RAT SAPDA WICHAN] Concerning the election, some people have observed that the Paris accord does not state that an election must be held in May next year. And in view of the fact that the Khmer Rouge has not returned to the negotiating table, there should not be an election.

[Khien] They did not set a date for the election in the accord or in any of the appendixes. But I think they agreed at an SNC meeting. Thus, the election could be postponed. That would not violate the Paris accord. If anything that violates the Paris accord is done, that will give the various factions an excuse to escape their commitments. For example, saying that a president will be elected first so that Prince Sihanouk can become president is a violation of the Paris accord. If that is done, other factions will be free to do whatever they want. If someone violates the Paris accord and the United Nations supports that, that means that the United Nations supports abandoning the Paris accord. They can't do that.

As for other minor points on which they have agreed, they can reach some other agreement. For example, because things are still unsettled, the election can be postponed. The election can be held sooner than planned or postponed. That's up to the SNC to decide. The problem is that the United Nations is impatient, because the budget that has been allotted will run out in May. But in my view, it would be better not to hold an election if one faction refuses to participate. So much has already been done, it should be possible to obtain additional funds in order to extend the time. If there is clear hope, things can be postponed two or three months. Even if things had to be postponed until December next year, it would be worth it. The important thing is to have an honest and fair election. The United Nations may have to request funds from various countries. If they refuse, they can be informed.

If there are clear indications that a compromise can be worked out, I don't think that another 2 billion baht is that big an issue. They should be able to find the money. As compared with the amount spent during the war in the Middle East, this is a very small sum. This should be possible.

[SIAM RAT SAPDA WICHAN] What should Thailand's role be today?

[Khien] As I said earlier, we should deal with China. As for other countries, we should explain our position. We should explain our position to the United States, England, and France. We shouldn't let China explain things alone. There are those who detest China, too. Thailand has an advantage over the super powers. We should participate in the negotiations. But China will have the greatest weight, because China is close to the situation. And if China realizes that its interests are quite similar to those of Thailand, it will be willing to use its veto power. Thus, we must carry on diplomatic activities on that front.

Opinion Leaders, MP on Khmer Rouge Issue

Bad Image Outweighs Benefits

93SE0049A Bangkok SIAM RAT in Thai 9 Nov 92 p 3

[Excerpt] In his capacity as chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee, Dr. Krasae Chanawong, a Moral Force Party MP [member of parliament] from Bangkok, said that in implementing its policy on the Thai-Cambodian border problem in the zone of influence of the Khmer Rouge, the Thai Government should take steps to maintain the country's image along with protecting the interests of those businessmen who are carrying on legal activities. But if there is a conflict between these two things, the country's image will have to come first, because that is something that affects the majority of people. Trade matters, on the other hand, concern just a few businessmen.

Dr. Krasae said that the Khmer Rouge issue could tarnish Thailand's image in the eyes of the world community. The government must make a decision and implement a clear policy. Many countries think that the reason why the Khmer Rouge has refused to cooperate in implementing

the peace process of the United Nations is that it doesn't want to lose the trade profits that can be made along the border. If the Thai government cannot allay these suspicions, Thailand may be accused of being insincere about wanting to solve the problems of a neighboring country.

It is people in the private sector who are involved in the border trading activities. But whenever problems arise, this affects the country. Thus, the government should monitor things more closely. It isn't necessary to control and prohibit things. Rather, it should simply monitor things to ensure that everything is done properly, because today, there are rumors that by the end of 1992, the border may be closed. [passage omitted]

Khukrit Pramot on Problem

93SE0049B Bangkok SIAM RAT in Thai 9 Nov 92 p 5

["Soi Suan Phlu" column by Khukrit Pramot]

[Excerpts] The Khmer Rouge is still a player in the attempt to bring about peace in Cambodia. But the Khmer Rouge is not the only player. The other Cambodian factions are playing a part, too, as is becoming clearer and clearer.

I once wrote about the conference that was going to be held in Beijing between the various Cambodian factions, Thailand, France, and Indonesia in an effort to find a way to bring peace to Cambodia. [passage omitted]

The purpose of the conference in Beijing was to obtain data about the situation in Cambodia one year after the various factions signed the Paris peace accord. [passage omitted]

It must be admitted that Khmer Rouge, who signed the Paris peace accord, have not cooperated at all. They have, for example, refused to allow the UN forces sent to maintain peace in Cambodia to enter their zone of influence. Besides that, they have obstructed UN preparations for next year's general election in Cambodia. And they have refused to lay down their weapons or turn over their weapons to the United Nations.

As for these things, the Khmer Rouge claim that there are still Vietnamese soldiers in Cambodia. They say that as long as there are Vietnamese soldiers in Cambodia, they will not cooperate in building peace. [passage omitted]

There have been reports that the United Nations may have to ask Thailand to close its border with Cambodia in the area controlled by the Khmer Rouge. That would mean huge losses for the large number of Thais who have leased land and paid fees to the Khmer Rouge for the right to mine gemstones in the Pailin area. There are about 20,000 Thais who have gone into that area to mine gemstones. If the border is closed, those people will not have a job, and the financiers who invested in gemstone mining operations in Cambodia will lose their money. In short, that would be a big loss for Thais.

However, yesterday or today I read in the newspaper that the Thai-Cambodian border has already been closed because of the trouble that has occurred there. Apparently, the Khmer Rouge, or Khmer Rouge troops, have been

entering the country and robbing Thais inside Thailand. It's said that the reason why the Khmer Rouge have robbed and injured Thais is that the Thais cheated them in cross-border trading activities.

I don't know how many such stories there are. But in my view, Thai merchants are not minor traders. They employ various tricks. But if the Cambodians are dumber than the Thais or find themselves at a disadvantage, the only way they know to get even is to attack using weapons. [passage omitted]

During the time of the Chatchai Chunhawan administration, I had the feeling that he was serious about the Cambodia problem and that he had many constructive ideas and proposals. At that time, in the view of the world community, Thailand was a very important player in the Cambodian problem. But since the time of the Chatchai administration, succeeding administrations have seemed to be tired of this problem, with the result that Thailand's role in solving the Cambodia problem has declined, and our importance in the eyes of the world community has declined, too. [passage omitted]

KR Won't Suffer From Sanctions

93SE0049C Bangkok SIAM RAT in Thai 10 Nov 92 p 5

["Soi Suan Phlu" column by Khukrit Pramot]

[Excerpts] A couple of days ago, I wrote about the international conference held in Beijing to discuss peace in Cambodia and the coming general election there. I wrote that I wasn't sure if the conference would be a success. [passage omitted]

In view of the fact that the Khmer Rouge [KR] refuse to lay down their arms, the other Cambodian factions in Cambodia that are enemies of the Khmer Rouge know that there will be fighting unless the Khmer Rouge agree to abide by the terms of the accord signed in Paris a year ago, which called for the various factions to lay down their arms.

If the other Cambodian factions follow suit, the attempt by the United Nations to bring about peace in Cambodia will fail, and another civil war could break out in Cambodia. [passage omitted]

During the past 13 years, the Khmer Rouge have received weapons and economic aid from China. They received such aid throughout the period of the civil war in Cambodia. Because of this, the Khmer Rouge became the strongest faction in Cambodia.

But this time, China put pressure on the Khmer Rouge to participate in the conference in Beijing. Moreover, China fully supports the various UN measures on Cambodia. This shows that the close relationship between China and the Khmer Rouge is growing weaker. Various diplomats have said that China is trying to wash its hands of the Cambodia problem and distance itself from the Khmer Rouge. [passage omitted]

Last Saturday, General Wimon Wongwanit, the Thai Army commander-in-chief, said that he is opposed to imposing economic sanctions against the Khmer Rouge, because that will not accomplish anything. [passage omitted]

Everything that I have written above shows the failure of the international conference in Beijing aimed at bringing peace to Cambodia. That conference was a failure. Nothing was achieved.

Today, the various parties concerned are all unsure about what to do next in order to restore peace there. I agree with Gen. Wimon Wongwanit that imposing economic sanctions against the Khmer Rouge won't achieve anything, because those people have been living in the jungle for many years. They can withstand the suffering and difficulties better than others. The only thing that economic sanctions will do is reduce the Khmer Rouge's income from gemstone trading. And that could cut economic and social aid. But that won't bother the Khmer Rouge.

Imposing economic sanctions on wealthy people who are used to a good life is much easier than imposing sanctions on people who are used to hardships and who have been living in the jungle for many years. Because if those who are used to hardships have to undergo additional hardships because of shortages, that won't bother them too much.

Find Way for KR in Poll

93SE0049D Bangkok THAI RAT in Thai 2 Nov 92 p 3

[Editorial: "Don't Divide Cambodia in Two"]

[Excerpts] The world's dream of restoring Cambodia and making it whole again, a dream that seemed as if it were about to come true, now seems to be as far away as ever. Last week, the Thai-Japanese team that the United Nations sent to negotiate with the Khmer Rouge in an effort to get them to agree to lay down their weapons and adhere to UN regulations openly announced that it had failed completely. [passage omitted]

It's worth thinking about why the Khmer Rouge has refused. One of the reasons that seems quite clear today is that the Khmer Rouge are afraid that the others will join together and prevent them from winning any seats, or only a few seats, in the election. If that happened, they would have no part in running the country, and that could lead to the death or imprisonment of large numbers of their people. In view of the great pressure being exerted on them, the Khmer Rouge would probably be satisfied to set up their own independent state.

Indonesia and France, the joint chairmen of the Paris peace conference, will have to look for a new way to solve this problem. We would like to suggest that in the general election scheduled to take place at the beginning of next year, the United Nations should find a way to hold the election in the Khmer Rouge's zone of influence regardless of whether or not the Khmer Rouge agrees to participate in the election. Because if that zone is excluded, that will be tantamount to ceding a portion of Cambodia to the Khmer Rouge.

Regardless of what measures the United Nations stipulates to punish the Khmer Rouge, we don't think that any nation will voice opposition, because the purpose of this will be to prevent the formation of two Cambodias. That would not benefit the world, and it certainly wouldn't be good for Thailand.

MILITARY

Wimon Wongwanit Biographic Profile

93SE0048A Bangkok MATICHON in Thai 10 Nov 92 p 22

[Excerpt] [passage omitted] Even though the past of General Wimon Wongwanit is no secret, the things that he had to say were very interesting.

"I began my military career at the Pa Wai Camp in Lopburi, where I remained until I entered the Army Command and General Staff College. After that, I was stationed in the northeast for a short period before returning to Lopburi as a member of a paratroop unit. I stayed with that unit until I was appointed a special forces commander. That was in the period 1969-1971."

After 1971, he was engaged in combat operations outside the country, mostly in Laos. After that, he was transferred back to the special forces division.

"I worked as an operations officer. After that, I was made head of the Special Force Research and Development Division. Then, in 1974 I was sent to the northeast. In 1976 I was appointed deputy chief of staff in Ubon Ratchathani. In 1977 I attended the staff officers school in England. After I returned, I served as an instructor at the Army Command and General Staff College. In 1979 I was transferred to the northeast, where I served as commander of the 6th Infantry Regiment. At the end of 1980 I was appointed deputy commander of the 6th Division." (LAENG KHAO, 29 August 1983)

In October 1982 he was promoted to major general and appointed commander of the 1st Special Forces Division. During that same period, General Suchinda Khrapayun, the deputy director of operations, was promoted to director of army operations, and General Isaraphong Nunphakdi, the deputy commander of the 1st Royal Guards Division, was promoted to commander of the 6th Infantry Division.

Even though his dream as a young officer was to become commander of the Pa Wai unit, he was not at all disappointed at being appointed commander of the 1st Special Forces Division.

"I think that I have gone even farther than that. I am the commander of a unit that is superior to the Pa Wai unit. Thus, when I am asked if I am satisfied with my work, my response has to be 'yes.'" [Wisanchani Nakhon, "A Weekend with Major General Wimon Wongwanit," HI CLASS, June 1985]

Gen. Wimon Wongwanit is a native of Chaiya District, Surat Thani Province. But his close ties are to Ubon Ratchathani and Lopburi provinces.

He has close ties to Ubon Ratchathani because he has had close comrades in arms there ever since he served as the chief of staff of the 6th Infantry Regiment and later regimental commander and deputy commander of the 6th Division. Furthermore, he met and fell in love with Major Mali Wongwanit, a dental surgeon from Det Udom District in Ubon Ratchathani Province.

"At that time, I didn't think very much about women. Initially, we were just friends. We just took walks together and things like that. But as I grew older, I started thinking about having children and a family. There has to be compatibility. I think that compatibility is just as important as love."

Gen. Wimon Wongwanit was married shortly before he turned 34 years old.

But he has even deeper ties to Lopburi, particularly with the paratroop forces. He served with that unit from the time it was just a small unit until it was turned into the special forces division and finally the Special Warfare Command. His ties to this unit are as close as those of General Prem Tinsulanon to the Second Army Region and the northeast even though he [Gen. Prem] was born in Songkhla Province.

"Comparing our lives to others, laborers sell their labor and merchants sell goods. We have to sell our lives, right? But we can't think like that, because you can't put a price on human life. We have to have ideals so that we will be willing to sacrifice what others would refuse to sacrifice."

Even though he said that he would not become involved in politics and once refused the position of commander of the 1st King's Guard Division because he thought it was tied too closely to politics, in an interview with "Fuong Fa" in LAENG KHAO in August 1983, he talked about ways of developing democracy.

"In our country, parliament will have to be dissolved many more times in order to achieve democracy. When that happens, they will learn their lesson. Financiers won't dare invest in this. Otherwise, traitors with money and influence will fill parliament. That is very worrisome."

Since 1983, parliament has been dissolved four times, and we have had four general elections.

ECONOMIC

Police, Logging Interests Cooperate Along Border

93SE0035A Bangkok Naeo Na in Thai 21 Oct 92 p 5

[Article by Bunchai Asawa-arunothai : "Police, Businesses Cooperate on Economic Interests on Burma Border"]

[Text] General Wimon Wongwanich, Army commander, is a man of few words but whenever he talks it causes an uproar.

Following the arrest of Thai officials and villagers by Burmese soldiers in Mae Hong Son Province, Gen. Wimon said that "in order to solve the border problem, we have to first of all consider the national interest above personal interests. When we do that, it will be easier to solve border problems. Individual or group personal interests might affect the nation in the future."

If we analyse Gen. Wimon's statement, we find two interesting points. First, there are some interests at the border. Second, these cause problems.

Even though Gen. Wimon did not elaborate on what the "interests" at the border are and how they cause problems, everybody realizes that the border between Thailand and Burma is full of enormous interests both legal and illegal trading involving weapons, drugs, and timber.

There are three interest groups involved: 1. Influential Thai businessmen who conspire with local and central government officials and politicians; 2. Senior Burmese officers, both in Rangoon and who command troops along the border; and 3. We cannot forget the Karen forces, the self-styled liberation forces who maintain a strong presence along Thai-Burmese borders. Karen forces are seeking their cut by requesting protection money from Thai businessmen who want to trade across the border. Their take from this is quite large and sometimes it is much more than what Thai businessmen have to pay Burmese generals.

Besides paying off the Karens, many times Thai businessmen often facilitate the movement of Karen forces from one area to reinforce another area where they are fighting the Burmese.

This is the cause of the problems at the border.

One reason for the arrest of six Thai fishermen who entered Burmese territorial waters was the attack last October by more than 300 Karens at Huai Pong Lao barracks, a Burmese stronghold in which more than 100 Burmese troops died.

This incident had infuriated Gen. Muang Aye, Burmese commander in Shan State because it came to be understood that those Karen forces had come across the Thai border from Kanchanaburi and Ratburi Provinces with help from Thai businessmen.

Gen. Muang Aye ordered drastic measures to get back at Thailand. Any Thai national who trespassed onto Burmese territory would be arrested, starting with the six Thai fishermen, the chief of Mae Hong Son District and his entourage who had come to negotiate the release of the fisherman, and the relatives of those who were first arrested.

Whether or not there are any Thai helping Karens for personal gain, only time will tell. However, the conflict has begun.

The interests along the Thai-Burmese border have been in the works for a long time. The arrest of the chief of the Mae Hong Son District and more than 20 Thai by the Burmese is just another incident.

In the past, there was such a serious conflict that the Police Department had to send Police Deputy Director Gen. Pratin Santipraphop to investigate locals officials who conspired with businessmen in illegal logging.

It started when the Joint Coordination Center, Supreme Command, requested a Ministry of Interior investigation of the following police officers: Police Colonel Charoen Maniwong, superintendent, Mae Hong Son provincial police; Police Major Narong Bamrugrat and Police 1st Lieutenant Somphon Phromsri, officers in the Sop Maey Branch District police station, Mae Hong Son Province. They were suspected of hiring Karens with Burmese nationality to engage in illegal logging in Huai Mae Pua and Huai E Nuan, Mae Ka Subdistrict, Mae Sarieng District, Mae Hong Son Province, and disguising the logs as Burmese for sale to the Santi Forestry Co.

The Ministry requested that the Police Department investigate and the matter was turned over to Police Gen. Pratin.

From Gen. Pratin's investigation, it was learned that the following four Thai companies engaged in logging in Burmese territory near Mae Hong Son:

1. The Santi Forestry Co. had concessions in two areas in Burma. One was at Kha Kawin, Karen State, and transported timber to Thailand via Ban Mae Sam Laep Subdistrict, Sop Maey Branch District, and Ban Sakeup, Mae Khong Subdistrict, Mae Sarieng District. The other was at lower Ban Mae Jae, Kayah State, and transported timber to Thailand via Ban Huay Ton Nun, Mae Ngao Subdistrict, Khun Yuam District, Mae Hong Son Province.
2. Union Par Co. had concessions in two areas. One was in upper Ban Mae Jae, Kayah State, and transported timber to Thailand via Ban Pratu Muang Nok, Khun Yuam Subdistrict, Khun Yuam District. The other was in middle Ya Song, Kayah State, and transported timber to Thailand via Ban Mae Kong Kha, Mae Yuam Subdistrict, Mae Sarieng District, Mae Hong Son Province.
3. Mae Moei Timber Industries had a concession in Burma in the area opposite Ban Mae Kong Kha, and transported timber to Thailand via Ban Mae Kong Kha, Mae Yuam Subdistrict, Mae Sarieng District, Mae Hong Son Province.
4. Phanachai Saw Mill Co. had a concession in Burma opposite Ban Sao Hin, Sao Hin Subdistrict, Mae Sarieng District, Mae Hong Son Province, and transported timber via Ban Sao Hin, Mae Sarieng District, Mae Hong Son Province.

None of these companies operating in Burma did the logging themselves. They hired subcontractors which included Udon Timber Trading Co., Pairot Timber Trading Co., Phonphana Timber Trading Co., Siam Sak Thong Co., Sirikaset Co., Suwan Industrial Co., Thai Pong Saw Mill Co., Pathum Thani Saw Mill Co., Police Captain Khanong Suksaranrom's group, Mr. Praphat Panya-chatrat, Mr. Chokchai Chokkhayaikit, ex-Representative Chiangmai, Mr. Sayom Ramasut from Third Division, and Mr. Watthana Malisathan.

It should be noted that Police Captain Khanong was the Sop Maey Branch District police station deputy inspector.

The accusation by the Joint Coordination Center, Supreme Command, began after it acquired some information that the Sirikaset Co. with Mr. Sombun Sirikaset, then a Provincial Councilman, and the group under Police Captain Khanong Suksaranrom engaged in illegal logging in Thai territory by hiring the Karens to cut the trees and disguise them as Burmese timber. They then transported the timber to concessionaires and set up buying points along Salwee river.

However, he could have been involved by facilitating the transport of timber by the sub-concessionaires in Burma who floated them down Salwee river inside Mae Hong Son Province to the concessionaires.

Although Police Colonel Charoen issued the order to facilitate this, he did so openly to prevent illegal logging in Thai territory disguised as Burmese logs.

The only thing was that he assigned Police Major Narong Bamrugrat, inspector of the Sop Maey Branch District police station, Police Captain Khanong Suksaranrom, deputy inspector, Police 1st Lieutenant Somphon Phromsri, deputy inspector, Warrant Officer Thawin Sriwichai, and Police Master Sergeant Thawisak Kanha, officers at the Sop Maey Branch District police station to facilitate things.

The assignment to Police Captain Khanong, whose private business was in logging transport and whose name appeared in the military blacklist for this, seemed suspicious.

Besides, Police Captain Khanong and Mr. Sombun's group were involved in a dispute with Mr. Suwit Wetchakit's group and Mr. Buphen Kawirat, then a Mae Hong Son Municipal Representative and also the forest manager of the Sirin Technology Co., which was cutting Burmese logs. The conflict between these two groups was so severe that Police Captain Khanong hired Mr. Somchit or Bun or Comrade Sutchai and his gang to kill Mr. Bunphen and Mr. Suwit during their negotiations in paying protection money to the Karens.

Even though Police Colonel Charoen's conduct was in compliance with the provincial governor's order to assist in transporting timber across the border, his selection of someone engaged in trading Burmese timber and illegal logging in Thailand seemed inappropriate in the opinion of military intelligence.

Moreover, Police Colonel Charoen was so involved in assisting the transport of timber that he openly called on Burmese officials and the Karens to negotiate protection payment. This was highly inappropriate.

The sub-concessionaires engaged in illegal logging in Thailand, floating them down Salween river and claiming them as Burmese timber because they had to pay protection and illegal taxes of 3,600 baht per cubic meter to the Karens

who controlled the area. Besides, the logging areas were more than 20 kilometers inside Burmese territory, which was very costly.

Though the investigation could not nail high-ranking officials did for lack of a smoking gun, the investigation by Police General Prathin's team did reflect the hugely powerful influences along the Thai-Burmese border, including the involvement by the Karens.

These are the causes of the unending border problems as General Wimon has stated.

If the government wants to solve this problem, it should study Police General prathin's investigation.

However, if it is reluctant to do so because it would implicate certain individuals, then it is very unfortunate for the Thai people.

POLITICAL

Province Strengthens Military To Defend Border

932E0026A Hanoi TAP CHI QUOC PHONG TOAN
DAN in Vietnamese Sep 92 pp 73-79

Article by Senior Colonel Nguyen Quoc Cuong, deputy commander and chief of staff of Dong Thap Province Military Command: "Dong Tap Intensifies Armed Forces Building To Carry Out Well the Task of Developing and Defending the Border"]

[Text] We have determined that the Armed Forces along the border of Dong Thap, a province situated on the southwestern border of the fatherland, under the new circumstances of the world and the region, in view of the present situations in Cambodia and in our country, and on the basis of the missions assigned by the upper echelon, have the following missions:

- Serving as the hard core of the people in maintaining readiness and taking the initiative in defeating infiltrations by commandoes and reconnaissance agents and all plots to encroach upon the border or invade our country's territory; defending the inviolability of the fatherland's sovereignty and territorial integrity, and solidly defending the locality under all circumstances.
- Coordinating closely with the public security sector and the other dictatorial organs, resolutely suppressing the counter-revolutionaries and the other kinds of criminals, opposing smuggling across the border, maintaining political security and social order and safety, and defending the people's peaceful lives.
- Participating in building political bases and in economic-social development, contributing to building a comprehensively strong border defense, and developing a solid national defense-security potential and battle-field position.

First of all, Dong Thap is concerned with rectifying its Armed Forces organizationally to insure that they can fulfill the above requirements and missions.

With regard to the regular forces:

In carrying out the policy of reducing the state's regular forces, Dong Thap has strictly adjusted the province's regular forces in correct accordance with the stipulations and guiding thoughts of the Military Region: reducing the number of regular troops while undergoing a transformation with regard to thought and organization; and improving the quality of the remaining forces in all regards, to insure that the Armed Forces are prepared to fight and to fulfill all missions well.

The military organs of the province and 11 districts and cities have been streamlined and reduced. They consist of officers with quality, ability, and experience in local military work who have been rectified with regard to organization and working methods, and have been trained to raise their level to that of the new responsibilities and missions. Although its troop strength is limited, Dong

Thap still gives priority to strengthening the military organs of two border districts—Tan Hong and Hong Ngu—so that they can have a sufficient number of cadres to fulfill well the local military missions.

The party committee echelons, governmental administrations, and provincial and district military organs have concentrated on building up the local troops units, so they have quickly stabilized with regard to organization and have improved the quality of training and their combat-readiness capability. Because Dong Thap already had two economic-national defense companies, recently, when the High Command adopted the policy of restoring the local troops in some key areas, those two companies were quickly transformed into local troops of the two border districts. With the encouragement of the Military Region and the approval of the provincial party committee and the provincial people's committee, during the coming period we will organize additional economic-national defense units, which will both do economic work and undertake military training, and will maintain combat-readiness and readiness to supplement the regular forces when necessary. With the authorization of the Military Region Command and the approval of the provincial people's committee, Dong Thap has adopted the policy of encouraging some specialized noncommissioned officers to voluntarily extend their tours of duty in the military ranks (with expenses paid by the locality) to retain hard-core forces to use the weapons and equipment and insure combat-readiness within a certain period of time (because active-duty military service has been reduced to two years.)

To prepare forces to promptly supplement the Army when war breaks out, Dong Thap considers the task of building up reserve forces as playing a very important role at present. In recent years, the command of Military Region 9 has had a plan to bring military recruits of each province and district into specialized technical units and combined units to create conditions for the localities to organize reserve forces that can be mobilized more easily. In building reserve forces in Dong Thap, the districts, cities, and bases have essentially been assigned the tasks of registration, management, assignment, and training (the training of main-force units of the Military Region and High Command will be undertaken jointly by the upper and lower echelons.) To date, Dong Thap has registered all of the Class I reserve troops in the locality and has assigned them to reserve units in accordance with the principles and military specialties. It has made all-out efforts to restrict the sphere of mobilization to facilitate management, training, and deployment. In the immediate future, the province will concentrate on solidly building a provincial infantry reserve unit, two units of the two border districts, a number of companies of the rear-echelon districts and cities, and some hard-core companies from the combat arm units to insure quality and a high degree of combat-readiness, so that when they are mobilized they can meet the requirements that are set forth. In future years the building of high-quality reserve forces will gradually be expanded throughout the province.

With regard to the militia and self-defense forces:

Since 1989, Dong Thap has emphasized concentrating on comprehensively consolidating the military and self-defense forces. Previously, the militia and self-defense forces accounted for more than 10 percent of the population, so the localities could not manage them well, there were insufficient training funds, and the activities were insufficient.

After Directive 55 of the Secretariat and the Militia and Self-Defense Statutes were promulgated by the Council of Ministers, the provincial military party commission studied them and issued a resolution on implementing them. By mid-1990 they had been implemented in nearly all villages, wards, organs, and enterprises. By studying them, the cadres and people of the localities came to understand more clearly the role and position of the militia and self-defense forces in the new situation, and therefore selected people who were reliable politically, enthusiastic, positive, and voluntarily participated in the military and self-defense forces.

Nearly all of the villages and wards in Dong Thap have set up force building committees that are headed by the chairmen of the people's committees and the membership of which consists of the village and ward unit commanders, the public security police commanders, and the managing cadres of a number of sectors and mass organizations. The force building committees are responsible for organizing the people of each neighborhood, hamlet, and production collective to study and discuss the local national defense-security mission and selecting people sufficiently qualified to join the military and self-defense forces. On the basis of selections made by the people, the force building committee, based on the organizational requirements and the quality, ability, and health of each person, assigns them to combat or combat-support units. It also passes judgment on expelling unqualified people from the militia and self-defense forces.

To date the militia and self-defense forces of Dong Thap account for 1.3 percent of the population. In the two border districts of Tan Hong and Hong Ngu they account for more than 2.8 percent of the population. Although the militia and self-defense forces have declined in comparison to the past, quality has been improved. For example, in Hong Ngu District, in the course of three years of consolidation the total number declined by more than 1,000 people, but the number of party members in the militia and self-defense forces increased (to 6.61 percent), Youth Union members increased (to 19 percent), and demobilized military personnel increased (to 1.8 percent).

The present organizational structure of the Dong Thap militia and self-defense forces is that all neighborhoods, hamlets, organs, and enterprises have both hard-core forces and mass forces. All villages and wards have organized mobile and on-the-spot combat platoons. In the villages along the border and in the key areas, some militia units are on combat alert on a rotating basis, and there are

such essential specialized teams and units as combat engineers, communications, reconnaissance, firepower, medical, etc.

In order to improve the management and command capability of the militia and self-defense forces, Dong Thap has paid attention to strengthening the cadres. The military command committees of the villages and wards have three full-time members. All of the secretaries of party organizations and chapters at the basic level are also political officers of the village and ward units. In the two border districts of Tan Hong and Hong Ngu, 100 percent of the village unit cadres are good party members, of whom 60 percent have been elected to the local party committees. Nearly all of the village and ward unit commanders have received specialized and professional training at the Military Region and provincial military schools. In 27 villages and towns in the two border districts 17 party chapters and 10 security-national defense party cells were organized, thus contributing practically to strengthening the leadership of the basic-level party organizations toward the national defense-security work.

Second, political education and military training were strengthened and the level of knowledge and ability regarding combat and work of the Armed Forces was continually raised.

In view of the complicated changes in the world and in our country, the resolutions of the military party committee of Dong Nai Province have confirmed that political-ideological education is a foremost task of the mission of building the Armed Forces. The Armed Forces must be built so that they have solid political skills, have profound belief in socialism and in the party's leadership, correctly understand the nation's situation and the role of Armed Forces in the present renovation task, clearly understand the unit's mission, and strictly carry out all orders. At the same time, there must be education to heighten their spirit of revolutionary vigilance, enable them to realize clearly the poisonous "peaceful change" plots and schemes of the enemy and the possibility that they will insanely intervene militarily in many forms, and therefore both increase their will and determination to fight and their readiness to defeat all sabotage and aggression plots of internal and external enemies, and solidly defend the border, the territorial integrity of the fatherland, the party, and socialism.

To attain those goals, Dong Thap has overcome all difficulties, resolutely organized the good implementation of the political education program for all cadres, enlisted men, party members, and Youth Union members in the local troop units, the economic-national defense units, the reserve units, and the militia and self-defense forces. Furthermore, it has intensified current events information and firmly maintained the study regimes and regular activities of the units and Youth Union chapters, and promptly uncovered and corrected the misunderstandings of the cadres and enlisted men. Recently, the province has concentrated on doing a good job of carrying out an education campaign to explain the resolution of the seventh party congress and the resolutions of the fifth congress of the Dong Thap Province party Organization to all cadres and party members. In addition to organizing well the reading of newspapers, listening to the radio, and watching TV, the military organs at all levels continually

organize the dissemination of current events information to the units, with many contents and in many forms that are appropriate to each category, that deal directly with the current problems of the world, the nation, the locality, and the border.

Especially, recently Dong Thap, in view of the new developments in the Cambodian situation, has also paid attention to educating the cadres and enlisted men so that they can fully understand and carry out well the party's external policy, have a correct attitude vis-a-vis the Paris Agreement on Cambodia, respect our friends' independence, sovereignty, and territorial integrity, and continue to maintain and develop the peaceful friendly relations between Vietnam and Cambodia.

In addition to political education, Dong Thap has confirmed that military training is a very important mission that is intended to increase the combat strength of the Armed Forces. According to the slogan, "basic, practical, and solid," the province has paid attention to good training in the contents and programs stipulated by the military Region, while training in the necessary tactical and technical contents required by the operational plan to defend the border and are appropriate to the specific missions of each force and unit. As regards the local troops, it has concentrated on training and supplementing the cadres and creating good training, and gradually making training a professional system. With regard to the militia, self-defense, and reserve forces, it has concentrated on two main categories: the mobile combat forces and the Class I reserve troops. Every year an average of 80 to 85 percent of the province's militia and self-defense forces undertake training, as do 60 to 70 percent of the reserve forces. Recently, because of the consequences of the situation in Cambodia and the necessity to renovate the form of border relations between the two countries, the Armed Forces of the border districts and villages also study essential information about the "Treaty defining the national borders of Vietnam and Cambodia," "The Paris Agreement on Cambodia," border management regulations, and the methods of controlling, patrolling, and guarding to defend the frontier and the border markers, and the method of struggling by means of negotiations to prevent acts that violate the border management regulations, encroach upon land or population centers, or the moving of border markers, if such things should occur.

In order to bolster, and evaluate the leadership and management ability of, the party apparatus, the governmental administration, the military organs, and the mass associations in the mission of defending the locality and inspecting the capabilities to mobilize the reserve troops, and the coordinated combat capability of the Armed Forces, in 1990 Dong Thap organized defensive maneuvers at the provincial level. In those maneuvers, the province mobilized for active duty a number of reserve units and militia and self-defense forces in eight districts and cities. The number of troops concentrated was 77.6 percent of the plan. The highest percentage—98.82 percent—was attained by the reserve battalion of Hong Ngu District. In 1991, the military organs of the two border

districts coordinated with the Border Defense troops in holding regular unit maneuvers and mobilized all of the militia of the forward-area combat clusters, who began to grasp the operational methods of combat to defend the border. The two maneuvers improved the ability of the party echelons, governmental administrations, and military organs at all levels to lead, manage, and command coordinated combat, as well as their capability to mobilize Armed Forces to fulfill combat missions and defend the border under complicated circumstances.

Third, the Armed Forces coordinate closely with the relevant forces to solidly defend our sovereignty and border security, while actively participating in the local revolutionary movements and contributing to building a rich and strong base area.

Dong Thap's view is that building the Armed Forces to fulfill their missions well in peacetime and wartime (and to simultaneously build and fight in wartime) is a good slogan in troop training. In that spirit, Dong Thap builds its Armed Forces so that they can fulfill well both missions: combat readiness and work.

In order to put the combat readiness mission onto the right track, the military organs at all levels and the local troop units and mobile combat militia units rigidly maintain the command alert, duty officer, and combat alert systems, and are prepared to fulfill all missions. The militia forces of the villages on the border front line continually coordinate with the border defense troops and public security police in patrolling, guarding, checking out strangers, and opposing the border crossers and criminals in the border area, and maintain security and order in the area.

Dong Thap regards building close relations between the governmental administration and the state control forces of Vietnam and Cambodia along the border as an important element in building a peaceful, friendly border. In previous years, prior to the Paris Agreement on Cambodia, in accordance with an agreement between the governmental administrations of Dong Thap and Prayveng provinces, representatives of the party committees, governmental administrations, military organs, the public security police, and a number of functional sectors in our border districts and villages and those of our friends held regular meetings to discuss the political security and social order and safety situations along both sides of the border, and to discuss and coordinate in resolving relevant complicated problems. Therefore, during those years the governmental administrations and people in the two countries' border areas continually maintained good relations and the incidents that occurred were resolved rapidly and smoothly. The coordination in the activities of the Armed Forces of the two sides played a good role in maintaining security and order in the border area, to the benefit of both countries. Now the situation of relations between the two countries is different from the past. Dong Thap wants to continue those meetings in a new form determined by the two sides so that they can coordinate in maintaining political security and social order in the border areas of the fatherland.

The Armed Forces continually coordinate with the public security, customs, and tax sectors in actively opposing cross-border smuggling. During the 1989-1991 three-year period the militia of the border villages also independently made 205 arrests and confiscated goods valued at nearly 1.8 billion dong, which were turned over to the relevant organs for disposition. With regard to attacks against criminals (in close coordination with the public security police), in only two recent campaigns we arrested and brought to justice two people who had escaped from a reeducation camp and two people who fled after committing murder, intercepted many gangs of armed robbers, and confiscated cattle and property valued at more than 75 million dong that had been stolen by bad people, which were returned to the people on both sides of the border.

Implementing the civilian proselyting work policy of the party committee of the Military Region 9 Command, Dong Thap sent units into the field to combine military training with carrying out mass proselyting and labor to help the people. After sending local provincial battalion 502 to an area deep within a former resistance war base area as a test case to gain experience. The provincial command has continued to send district economic-national defense units and mobile combat militia units of some villages to do civilian proselyting activity. That activity has become a regular practice.

In the field exercises the units actively propagandized and urged the people to carry out the stands and policies of the party, the state, and the locality, and contributed to building political bases and the local militia and self-defense forces. At the same time, they worked to help the localities build and repair such public works as bridges, roads, schools, and clinics, dredging canals, improving fields, and help the people produce. According to preliminary figures, during the past three years the provincial Armed Forces have assisted the people by providing nearly 10,000 work days. During a recent large flood, the provincial Armed Forces quickly sent forces to the heavily flooded areas to help evacuate people and property, and to try to harvest rice and vegetable crops. After the flood, the provincial Armed Forces continued to help the people overcome the consequences and resume their lives, and contributed more than 50 million dong to aid flood victims.

As a result, the civilian proselyting work not only contributed to bolstering the military-civilian relationship—thereby creating closeness between the party and the people—but also served to forge the troops in actual work and help them become familiar with the terrain and way of life outside the camp. It helped the cadres and enlisted men heighten their viewpoint of serving the people and increased their self-respect and pride toward the appellation “Troops of Uncle Ho,” who are loved and trusted by the people.

Fourth, developing a spirit of self-reliance, the locality, the units, and the people are jointly concerned with living conditions of the Armed Forces and insuring the regulations and policies regarding them.

That is a matter that both manifests the social policy and contributes to maintaining and promoting the building and activities of the Armed Forces. In recent years, in addition to implementing those systems and policies stipulated by the state, the party organization, governmental administration, and people of Dong Thap have shown all-out concern for the living conditions of the Armed Forces and have partly guaranteed the regulations and policies regarding them, to the extent of the province's capability. The province's guideline with regard to that matter is developing the responsibility of the local administrations and use of local budget to provide partial assistance, while mobilizing fair, rational assistance from the people, combined with the self-sufficiency of the Armed Forces. On the basis of the specific situation, the villages and districts provide selective assistance to a number of village cadres, mobile combat militia forces, units on combat alert, and reserve troops when on active duty. At the provincial level, the province's annual over-all budget plan includes budgetary expenditures for the local military work. The province specifically decentralizes concern for living conditions and the implementation of systems and policies concerning the Armed Forces. For example, the province assists the regular troops, while the echelon managing reserve forces and militia and self-defense forces are responsible for their living conditions and for providing funds for training activity.

According to common regulations, the state provides support for only two or three village and ward military cadres. In Dong Thap, because the national defense-security missions at the villages and wards on the border front line are very difficult, the province, the districts, and the villages all provide funds to support 15 people (including three cadres in charge of village units and 12 militiamen on combat alert in the villages and wards.) Many villages and wards have assigned land and ponds to the militia units on combat alert so that they can both produce and fulfill their combat alert missions. Places without land allow the militia to perform such services as operating ferries, guarding bicycle parking areas, and protecting public works installations to create additional income.)

Something new closely related to building Armed Forces that Dong Thap has carried out since 1990 is the mobilization of some youths not in draftable categories to do social labor service in the locality for the same period of time as soldiers on active duty. It has implemented the system of exempting members of the reserve forces and militia and self-defense forces from social labor (Class I reserve troops and combat-alert and mobile combat militia and self-defense forces are completely exempted, while the militia and self-defense forces that fight on the spot receive a one-half reduction in time.) The province has a policy of exempting the families with merit toward the revolution and families with truly difficult circumstances. People unable to fulfill their labor obligations make contributions in money at rates determined by the province.

That policy has helped achieve social justice toward all youths in carrying out military service and encourages them to participate in the Armed Forces. It contributes to

encouraging the militia and self-defense members, and the reserve troops, to be at ease in training and activities and, most important, within a short period of time mobilized large numbers of young workers to participate in building key economic, social, and national defense installations in the locality, in the course of which youths are educated and forged. According to the province's unified policy, every year Dong Thap carries out troop recruitment while recruiting youths to fulfill labor obligations. To date, it has fulfilled nearly 40 percent of the plan to mobilize youths of working age.

Although the party organization, governmental administration, and people of Dong Thap have made many efforts in taking the initiative in showing concern for living conditions and enforcing the regulations and policies concerning the Armed Forces, but because the province's budgetary capabilities are still very limited and there are still many problems because no legal documents have been received from the upper echelon, difficulties are created for the lower echelon during implementation.

On this occasion, we would like to boldly recommend to the state the following: the Council of Ministers should clearly stipulate the ratio of the local military budget in order to create a legal basis and enable the province to take the initiative when drafting its budget and the military organ to take the initiative when receiving its budget. It is recommended that the Council of Ministers issue a legal document authorizing the locality to set up a "national defense support fund" to insure voluntary but fair contributions by all strata of people. It is necessary to promptly supplement the policies and have regulations for cultivating, training, commissioning, and promoting the reserve officers and full-time military cadres at the village and ward levels because they are the forces who directly organize and command the reserve units and the militia and self-defense forces at the local level. As regards the villages and wards on the border, it is recommended that the state increase the number of personnel it supports, for the present total of two or three people is too small.

MILITARY

Region V Commander Interviewed on Economic Task

932E0030A Hanoi QUAN DOI NHAN DAN
in Vietnamese 29 Sep 92 p 3

[Interview with Lieutenant General Phan Hoan, commander of Military Region V, by QUAN DOI NHAN DAN reporter Le Anh Dung; place and date not given: "Combining Economy With National Defense in Central Highlands"]

[Text] [Dung] In the last 17 years, the Military Region V (MR-V) Transportation Force operating in the Central Highlands has made many efforts to combine economic and national defense activities and has brought about realistic results. How do you assess what has been accomplished and what has not yet been done?

[Hoan] The Central Highlands is in a very important strategic position, political, economic, as well as security-national defense position, in regard not only to our country but also to our friendly neighboring countries.

Immediately after the South had been liberated, the leaders of our party, state, and Army repeatedly came to the Central Highlands to assert that the region should be built to become "politically stable, economically rich, and strong in terms of national defense." Having recognized the strategic position of the Central Highlands, back in the days of the resistance against America, in 1973, the CPV [Communist Party of Vietnam] committees of Region 5 and MR-V decided to organize Corps [Binh doan] 773 in charge of the economic task in the Buon Loi area. At the end of 1975, MR-V deployed thousands of commanding and leading cadres from the fronts and more than 2,500 vehicles of all kinds to reinforce and turn Corps 773 into three economic corps stationed in vital areas to carry out the task of combining economic and national defense activities in the strategic Central Highlands; initial economic, national defense, and social results were soon obtained. In the years of 1980-1983, a decision from the superior echelons was made to move the MR-V economic corps into the specialized ministries. Early in 1985, the military region established Corps 15 in charge of the task of combining economy with national defense in the Central Highlands, a move that clearly indicated that the Central Highlands must have an Army force specialized in economic activities.

In 17 years, in the light of the party resolutions and with the leadership of the Military Commission of the CPV Central Committee and Ministry of National Defense, the MR-V CPV Committee was directly leading the former economic corps and the present Corps 15, along with other units of the military region stationed in the strategic Central Highlands, in close coordination with the central sectors and economic installations in the region and with solidarity and close cooperation with the people and ethnic minorities in all localities, toward effectively doing economic work and successfully combining economy with national defense in many fields. The outstanding achievements were:

On the basis of the political task, namely, economy being combined with national defense, many work sites, state farms and forests, enterprises, and units chose to operate in vital locations, such as near the borders (Vietnam-Cambodia and Vietnam-Laos borders) and on important communications axes (if we considered only economic results, many units in the initial stage would be unable to operate there). The troops in charge of economic activities also had multifaceted operations: growing wet rice, growing and processing rubber and coffee, cutting and processing timber, doing water conservancy and engineering work, and so on. Although these economic activities brought about good results, the realistic results in the national-defense fields were more significant because the fact that Army units were involved in economic activities allowed us to create population centers in the region, to make ethnic minority people in neighboring areas feel

reassured to do productive work, and to prevent Vietnamese reactionary exiles from abroad from operating infiltration corridors in the region.

More realistic were the contributions to building the infrastructure; expanding, upgrading, and opening a number of roads to make communications for economic activities more convenient and to give our forces more mobility when necessary; and particularly making possible planning for rubber plantation areas. In the last few years, we planted new rubber trees in thousands of hectares of high-ground land having good value in terms of being military areas and covered bare hills in Duc Co and Ben Het with new trees.

[Dung] What are the issues that are being raised in the efforts of the MR-V Transportation Force in the Central Highlands to combine economy with national defense? What prospects for the future?

[Hoan] The resolutions adopted by the 4th Congress of MR-V Party Organization Delegates and by MR-V party committees have all asserted that, in the present situation, to build the economy and to combine it with national defense would be extremely important; since the Central Highlands is considered particularly more important in terms of location, importance must be permanently attached to all activities ranging from educating people to have a greater sense of responsibility to organizing implementation of these resolutions. The issues that are being raised have to do with striving to attain the economic goals on the basis of carrying out economic activities in the right direction, in compliance with the law, and in connection with total results—economic, national defense, and social results—while attaching importance to building political bases in villages, properly implementing the policies affecting the ethnic minorities, and along with the localities strengthening the mass-proselyting work so as to maintain and raise the ethnic people's confidence in the party, the revolution, and our regime. The most urgent task is to take care of the daily living and to resolve the issue of interests involving ownership of land and forests; economic units must be closely united with the Armed Forces in the region to properly fulfill the task of building strong border fronts, as well as to maintain political security and social order and security in the localities where they are stationed and to fully carry out the goals of their annual military training program.

The prospects are that the economic units of the military region are in a good position to achieve, first of all, the task of regularly teaching party committee echelons, cadres, workers, and civil servants the responsibility for combining economic with national defense activities, and that the economic installations, which have existed in these locations for 17 years, gain more and more experience in organizing economic management. However, things are not that simple if we at different levels do not maintain tight leadership, lack the many measures to provide step-by-step leadership, and fail to closely coordinate our work with the localities—in this case, the results will not be what we want to have by our subjective wishes.

[Dung] What set directions and measures do we need to have in order to build the Central Highlands to become more and more "politically stable, economically rich, and strong in terms of national defense" everyday?

[Hoan] To build the Central Highlands to become "politically stable, economically rich, and strong in terms of national defense" is a big multifaceted investment on the part of the Central Committee, state, and ministries and sectors concerned. This is also the hope of the party organizations, administrations, and people of the Central Highland provinces and the MR-V Armed Forces. In recent years, in spite of their attention, the ministries and sectors at the central level did not respond to the strategic position of the Central Highlands, failed to pay proper attention through their leadership, and were rather slow in striving to satisfy its construction needs. The cadres, party members, and soldiers who were deeply attached to the Central Highlands were worrying day and night about that situation. The ethnic minority people in the Central Highlands, who had been making sacrifices for the revolution and the construction and defense of the resistance bases, forever remembering what Uncle Ho had done for them, having confidence in the CPV, and always keeping loyal and affectionate solidarity between highlanders and Vietnamese, are still waiting for our realistic action. Therefore, first of all, there must be appropriate investment of all kinds from the higher echelons; at the same time, the state must provide the units in charge of economic activities in the Central Highlands with capital and favorable conditions.

On the part of the MR-V forces in charge of economic activities, many measures are needed to combine economy with national defense and to contribute to building the Central Highlands. But, first of all, they must adhere to and closely cooperate with the localities; relentlessly and gradually build effective political bases in villages, organize population centers along the borders, and mobilize the people and common forces of the military region and delta provinces for jointly building the Central Highlands; and hold preliminary reviews to draw experience in each of the topics that have been discussed lately, such as mass-proselyting work and organization of fulfillment of the national defense task on the part of the work sites, state farms and forests, and enterprises in the Central Highlands.

Conference To Review Consolidation of Defense 932E0031A Hanoi TAP CHI QUOC PHONG TOAN DAN in Vietnamese Sep 92 pp 52-58

[Article by Lieutenant General Nguyen De, member of CPV [Communist Party of Vietnam] Central Committee Political Bureau and commander of Military Region IX: "Three Years of Striving To Fulfill the Task of Consolidating National Defense in Military Region IX"]

[Excerpt] [passage omitted] The conference to review three years of implementing Resolution 02 of the Political Bureau (Resolution 02 for short), recently convened by the CPV [Communist Party of Vietnam] Committee and Command of Military Region IX (MR-IX or MR), was

aimed at correctly evaluating what had been done and what had not yet been done and drawing the necessary experiences to further accelerate and move to a new height the task of consolidating national defense and security. The major subjects dealt with at the conference were as follows:

Implementing Resolution 02, in the last three years the Army and people of MR-IX scored important initial achievements on the national defense-security front, which were reflected in these main points:

1. Through organizing a thorough understanding of Resolution 02, for the first time the MR succeeded in creating a high degree of unanimity among Army, civilian, government, and party cadres at all levels in regard to the party's renovation views on national defense and security in the new period of our country's revolution.

After having accepted Resolution 02, since the end of 1987, the Standing Committee of the MR-IX CPV Committee and Command had been organizing the understanding of the resolution among high- and mid-level cadres in the MR Armed Forces and issuing their own resolutions on assuming leadership over organizing its implementation. Early in 1988, they were joined by the standing committees of provincial CPV committees in extending the understanding of Resolution 02 to party committees and people's committees in all provinces; to a number of key cadres in provincial-level committees, sectors, and mass organizations; and to district party committee secretaries and district and city people's committee chairmen. From late 1988 to early 1989, on the basis of a thorough understanding of Resolution 02 and Directive No. 20 of the CPV Central Committee Secretariat, the provincial party committees took turns in issuing resolutions on leadership over the national defense-security task in their localities and extending the understanding of these resolutions to all echelons, committees, sectors, and mass organizations throughout their provinces. In subsequent resolutions, directives, and orders, the MR and provinces always set the national defense-security and international tasks as central ones; therefore, vigilance and awareness of their responsibility for the national defense-security task continued to be heightened in the entire political system.

2. A system of organizing CPV leadership over the local military work in the entire MR was set up and gradually perfected and, as a result, for the first time the following mechanism was working smoothly: The party assumed leadership; the administration supervised and managed; military organs served as staffs; and mass organizations and the people were masters in fulfilling the national defense and security tasks.

MR-IX believed that after having succeeded in making a new change in the perception and views of the political system toward the national defense-security task, a very important thing it should do was to begin early to build a system of organizing CPV military leadership in the spirit of Resolution 02 and the CPV Secretariat decision in order to ensure uniform implementation of the mechanism. In

this spirit, the system of organizing party leadership over local national defense-security work in MR-IX was built and then operated in an orderly fashion.

At the MR level, there was the MR-IX CPV Military Committee, which included a number of leading cadres in the MR Command and provincial CPV committee secretaries from all over the MR; at the provincial level, there were provincial CPV military committees consisting of a number of leading cadres in provincial military commands, provincial CPV committee secretaries, chairmen (or vice chairmen, directors of provincial planning commissions) of provincial people's committees, and directors of provincial public security services, and having the provincial CPV committee chairmen serve as their chairmen; at the district and city levels, there were district and city party military committees or district and city military workers groups, the composition of which was similar to that of provincial CPV military committees; and at the village and ward levels, village and ward party committee secretaries also held the position of political officers of village and ward units.

Many villages and wards in the MR-IX provinces set up their own security-national defense chapters or security-national defense party cells, which were aimed at closely combining the national defense and security tasks and strengthening the leadership of basic-level party organizations over the national defense and security work. Generally speaking, in the last few years, the system of organizing party military leadership gradually became smoothly operational, reflected the spirit of solidarity and unanimity in the party military committees, and properly achieved solidarity and coordination of all aspects of the work and all forces in the localities.

3. For the first time, a new national defense-security posture was built in the MR to cover inland areas, borders, and waters.

At all levels from MR and provincial to district, city, ward, and village, there were basic defense plans judged and approved by superior echelons; these plans continued to be revised, improved, and perfected in conformity with new developments in the situation and tasks.

Antisubversion plans were also drafted at all levels; the key locations already organized exercises to gain experience. As of January 1992, all eight former provinces in the MR had organized provincial-level defense area exercises. Forty-seven of 89 districts and cities and 459 of 1,144 wards and villages had organized exercises in accordance with different combat plans, which stayed close to the national defense and security tasks of individual localities.

The MR and provinces organized several surveys of the situation in border and coastal areas and in the territorial waters they were in charge of; on that basis, they adopted guidelines and plans for the construction, management, and defense of border areas and waters.

In a close combination with the plans for socioeconomic development of border and coastal areas, the provinces succeeded in making population adjustments by sending

an important segment of their population to border and coastal areas and a number of islands, thus forming a number of new wards, villages, population clusters, and economic-technical clusters in those areas so far unpopulated or sparsely populated where the economic potential remained unexploited. As a result, they created new on-the-spot forces that were used both for socioeconomic development and for defense of border and coastal areas. The networks of water conservancy canals and ditches, water-land communications, national electric power distribution, information and postal services, public health stations, schools, stores, and services facilities in deep inland, border, and coastal areas received a lot of investment from the provinces and were developed and expanded at a rather fast pace in recent years so as to increase the areas of cultivated land, to exploit new potential, to improve the standard of living, and at the same time to create a new advantageous posture for national defense and security.

The land that had remained uncultivated for a long time in a number of deep inland, border, and coastal areas were now covered by new trees planted in afforestation plans by the people, production collectives, state farms and forests, and Armed Forces, which were aimed both at contributing to economic development and improvement of the environment and landscape beauty and at creating a new national defense posture, now and in the long term. The combat solidarity and coordination among the forces that operated in the same locality, particularly in border and territorial waters areas, were gradually improved and worked in good operating order, with a more rational division of work and coordination, under the command of a unified command in each locality and area.

4. The national defense potential in the MR was greatly enhanced through the years of continued acceleration of local construction in accordance with the party line on renovation.

The MR's national defense potential lay in the very achievements in the fields of political, socioeconomic, cultural, education, and scientific-technical construction that the eight provinces in the MR had been scoring in the past years.

In the political field, it was the political system of proletarian dictatorship consisting of the party organizations, administrations, and mass organizations assembled in the VFF [Vietnam Fatherland Front] at levels ranging from provincial to basic, which were ceaselessly consolidated and strengthened in order to deserve being the true representatives of the people's right to mastery, to properly practice socialist democracy, and to successfully operate the mechanism of the party assuming leadership, the administration supervising and managing, and the people being masters. It was the new growth of politics and the people's intellectual standard on the part of all segments of the population through 17 years (from the time the South was totally liberated) of struggle to build and defend the socialist fatherland.

About the economic potential, the eight Mekong delta provinces, the country's principal rice granary, in 1991 obtained a total output of more than 10 million tons, with 40 percent being commodity rice. More than 4 million tons of rice which our country exported (since 1989) mainly came from the Mekong delta rice-growing region.

Beside rice as the principal product, the Mekong delta provinces also supplied to the country such agricultural products as marine and sea products, meats from various domestic animals and fowls, special-product fruits, vegetables of various kinds, sugarcane, coconut, and so on.

Thanks to the policy of encouraging development of a multicomponent commodity economy in the socialist direction, industry, small industry, and handicrafts recently showed good development and for the first time supplied the people and export with the essential commodities.

Export-import was boosted, with all provinces obtaining good rates of growth in terms of export income; as a result, contributions were made to maintaining balance between materials and raw materials used in production and improving the standard of living in the localities.

Closely linked with economic development, the material and technical base of the Mekong delta provinces showed a more remarkable rate of development compared to the past years. As to the means of land and river transportation alone, according to incomplete statistics, the eight Mekong delta provinces now had more than 7,000 passengers- and goods-transporting vehicles, nearly 15,000 passengers- and goods-transporting riverboats, and more than 50 seagoing ships. About information and postal services, in almost all provinces the internal telephone networks were now automatic ones.

Talking about the national defense potential, one could not help talking about the achievements in the educational, public health, and cultural fields, which directly had to do with improving and building people and building and defending the fatherland.

According to incomplete statistics, the MR-IX provinces so far had more than 160 general middle schools with nearly 2,300 classrooms, more than 2,500 general schools with more than 67,000 classrooms, and more than 4,800 kindergarten classrooms. In addition, all provinces had technical worker training schools and one or two higher schools, with some provinces having college departments. Former Hau Giang Province, including Can Tho City, had two colleges and a number of agricultural research institutes.

In public health, there were 84 hospitals, 1,060 public health stations, and 84 area-level medical examination offices, with a body of cadres consisting of 2,700 high-level physicians and pharmacists, nearly 10,000 midlevel doctors' assistants and pharmacists, and more than 10,000 nurses, pharmacists' assistants, and orderlies.

They constituted a new great potential for national defense in MR-IX. If they were properly prepared and mobilized in

peacetime, they would be a major force in the people's war for defense of the fatherland when war broke out.

5. The Armed Forces with three branches of service were further consolidated and strengthened along the line of having rational strength, good combat readiness quality and capabilities, and full ability to successfully fulfill any tasks.

The MR's main-force troops, after the voluntary troops had successfully accomplished their international obligation in Cambodia and returned to the country in September 1989, underwent its urgent plan for reduction of strength in compliance with the state policy. The remaining permanent force was reorganized in accordance with National Defense Ministry regulations and was redeployed in accordance with the needs of the MR's defense plan.

Provincial and district local troops in a number of key locations were quickly restored according to the ministry's directives. Thanks to the concern, guidance, and care of party committee echelons and people's committees, and the concentrated investment of provincial and district military organs in construction projects, the local Army units showed good progress, had good strength and relatively sufficient equipment, had cadres of quite good quality, and succeeded in quickly turning political education and military training into orderly operations.

The drafted reserve force, because the permanent troops were decreasing in number and the command echelons were providing better leadership due to their being aware of its greater importance, showed obvious changes and progress in registration, management, and training.

A new happening in the building of the MR's Armed Forces in the last few years was the emergence of economic-national defense units. These units could be considered a kind of peacetime permanent local troops whom the national defense budget did not have to support. They were to fulfill the economic task as their principal one so as to contribute to the economic development of their locality and to support themselves, and at the same time considered their military task a very important one: They were both the permanent combat force and the one to properly fulfill the task of building units in terms of military activities and training in accordance with a definite program and within a definite time frame determined by the provincial military command and at the same time to take part in maintaining security and order and in the mass-proselyting work in the locality. At the end of their service, the cadres and soldiers of economic-national defense units would be classified in class one reserve force. In addition to economic and national defense results, these units were also contributing to resolving the youths' job problem, achieving social justice in the fulfillment of military obligation, and providing the youths with education, training, and vocational training.

About building the militia and self-defense forces, in the last three years, the MR pursued the policy of improving their quality as its principal concern and getting them down to appropriate size through reorganization. Along

that line, all localities organized reviewing these forces to trim their size, which had once been increased excessively due to a hurried buildup, and reduced their proportion, from 10 percent of the population to a more rational one, while retaining their quality, particularly political quality. About the scope of organization, it overcame the tendency to be rigidly formal and instead adopted the policy of organizing militia combat platoons in villages and wards, and perhaps companies in certain villages. In key locations, the MR organized either a squad or a platoon and put it on the combat alert on a regular basis in villages and wards. In hamlets and neighborhoods, the common unit being organized was squad, with some hamlets being allowed to have militia combat platoons. The self-defense force to operate on the sea was organized into sea units, sea groups, and small detachments. Localities paid more attention to building and consolidating self-defense forces in neighborhoods, enterprises, organs, state farms, state forests, and so on. The commands of village and ward units were improved both qualitatively and quantitatively, particularly in key locations, where attention was paid to improving their political and military managing and commanding abilities toward the militia and self-defense forces.

Under the conditions of a limited budget and very little quotas granted by the state to the military sector of villages and wards, many localities used their own budget to boost the quotas of villages and wards in key locations; some localities were capable of building national defense-security funds at the basic level and actively helped and created favorable conditions for militiamen and members of the self-defense forces to do productive work, to provide services, and so on, so as to boost earnings as a means to contribute to ensuring the least decent living conditions in favor of the militia and self-defense forces being on the combat alert and to cover other necessary expenses on the part of the militia and self-defense forces.

Along with building the Armed Forces, the localities also provided the people with national defense education, which is now becoming an orderly activity.

In general, middle, vocational, and higher schools and colleges, students for the first time were given military training as part of the official curricula issued by the Ministry of Education and Training.

In the schools that provided party, administration, and sector cadres with elementary and advanced training, the military subjects were also included in their curricula so as to help these cadres to acquire the necessary knowledge of our party's views and line on national defense and the people's war and to understand the military task that they should fulfill while doing their work.

6. The MR's Armed Forces actively took part in productive labor and economic activities, and with initial results contributed to realistically improving the standard of living, promoting socioeconomic development, and consolidating national defense in the localities.

According to incomplete calculations, in 1991 alone, the Armed Forces with three branches of service in the MR

created a total volume of products valued at 150 billion dong, with their real profits amounting to about 30 billion dong. The Western General Corporation—the unit specialized in economic activities—began having full profit-and-loss accounting in the past years. Almost all production and business installations, in spite of the fact that they had just been established and had encountered many difficulties arising from complicated changes brought about by the market mechanism, succeeded in staying in business, maintaining relatively stable production, and having good prospects for development. The unhealthy phenomena in production and business that had been seen in a number of units and localities in the past years were all sternly criticized and firmly dealt with; as a result, these mistakes were reduced considerably.

7. The MR's Armed Forces actively took part in mass-proselyting activities and the building of local political bases, and at the same time closely coordinated their work with party committee echelons, administrations, and the people to properly implement the Army's rear-area policy.

Thoroughly understanding the great and urgent significance of the mass-proselyting task in the new situation, the Armed Forces in the entire MR, which included from organs and units in provinces and districts to main-force and local troops, economic-national defense units, and militia and self-defense forces, were enthusiastically carrying out that task, for the purpose of contributing to the propaganda and education aimed at the masses to promote their understanding of the line and policies of the party and state, building political bases, and assisting the people by providing them with labor in appropriate forms.

With the activities of the militia and self-defense forces being excluded, 22 battalions, 40 companies, and 68 work units and teams so far did mass-proselyting work involving more than 30,000 people-times to assist the people in 132 villages and wards in the MR. More specifically, following the recent rainstorms in the Mekong delta, all units in the MR were ordered to stop their training activities and to concentrate their energy on the task of assisting the people in preventing and fighting flood, and overcoming the aftermaths of flood.

The mass-proselyting activities of the MR's Armed Forces received the agreement, enthusiastic support, and assistance of the party organizations, administrations, and people in all localities. These activities helped to tighten even more the close blood-and-flesh relations between the people and the Armed Forces. On the other hand, by doing their mass-proselyting work, the cadres and soldiers of the Armed Forces had an opportunity to heighten their views on the masses, on their responsibility and pride regarding the title, "Uncle Ho's troops," and on fighting and making sacrifices for the country and for the people.

About the Army's rear-area work, the MR and provinces all made great efforts and creatively resorted to many forms of realistically returning favors and good deeds. According to incomplete figures, in the last three years, the provinces in the MR built 4,852 houses to benefit the families considered eligible by the rear-area policy. They

moved more than 9,300 tombs of dead heroes from scattered locations to dead heroes' cemeteries, accepted 42 seriously wounded soldiers to care for in their villages, and tried to get jobs for many among the discharged and demobilized military personnel. In some localities, there was a movement of mothers and sisters to be foster parents and to raise children of dead heroes, and to seek assistance for the families considered eligible by the policy but still encountering too many difficulties. They resolved the majority of the remaining cases of getting commendations and rewards and of families losing contact and MIA's in the wars. At present, the MR and provinces are urgently reviewing the remaining cases and policy shortcomings so as to draw up plans for resolving them once and for all in the time to come.

Looking back at the last three years, with the background of very complicated changes in the international situation and many harsh difficulties still existing in the country, thanks to a thorough understanding of the party line on renovation, Resolution 02/BCT, and other resolutions and directives on national defense-security of the CPV Central Committee and the state, the Armed Forces of the MR, along with the party organizations, administrations, and people of the provinces, succeeded in developing to a high degree the revolutionary will, the sense of self-sufficiency and self-reliance, and the dynamic and creative spirit; fulfilling many major aspects of the national defense-security task; and obtaining important initial results. Those were the important factors that allowed the Army and people of MR-IX to surely maintain political stability for achieving socioeconomic construction and development, for strongly defending sovereignty and territorial integrity in the southwestern part of the fatherland, and at the same time fulfilling the international obligation. This initial achievement served as the important basis for the MR to continue to properly fulfill the national defense-security task in the coming years. [passage omitted]

ECONOMIC

French Minister on Various Projects

932E0028A Hanoi QUAN DOI NHAN DAN
in Vietnamese 5 Sep 92 p 9

[Interview of J.L. Bianco, French vice minister of equipment, housing, transportation and space, by QUAN DOI NHAN DAN correspondent Ho Quang; place and date not given: "As If We Had Never Been Far Apart"]

[Text] During his first meeting with Vietnamese correspondents in Hanoi, Mr. J.L. Bianco, France's Minister of Equipment, Communications, and Transportation, affirmed that his first visit to Vietnam had unexpectedly harvested a bumper crop. It has been learned that the minister is a close friend of F. Mitterand, the French president. Having overcome the limits of ordinary social etiquette, he responded frankly and openly to the questions of a QUAN DOI NHAN DAN correspondent and his colleagues.

[Ho Quang] Why do you think this has been a bumper harvest?"

[Bianco] We have had excellent meetings with the leaders and our Vietnamese colleagues, which achieved unexpected results. In speaking with the Vietnamese authorities and meeting with the people on the street, who were always smiling, I had the impression that we had never been far apart. With regard to investment in Vietnam, at present France is in third place, behind Taiwan and Hong Kong. France's aid to Vietnam increased from 45 million francs in 1990 to 95 million francs in 1991 and 130 million francs in 1992. France has continually and actively defended Vietnam in the international financial and monetary organizations, has supported loans to Vietnam by those organizations, and has urged the United States to lift its economic embargo of Vietnam. Ordinarily, during such trips there is a tendency for people to express congratulations and make promises in an atmosphere of social etiquette. In contrast, thanks to practical discussions we were able to sign two ministerial-level agreements that we did not expect: an agreement on projects that will be implemented immediately, and an agreement on urban development and planning. Vietnamese and French corporations directly signed eight agreements. The Thomson Corporation signed an agreement to sell two sets of airfield landing equipment. We reached an agreement on modernizing Vietnam's aviation sector, including the modernization of aircraft, training Vietnamese aviation cadres, providing money to buy additional radar, modernizing the airfields, and developing the Civil Aviation Center in Ho Chi Minh City. In the near future we will inaugurate a Paris-Hanoi air route. In addition, we signed a number of agreements to build bridges, including the Gianh River, Tan Thuan, and My Thuan bridges, and to repair the Trang Hien bridge at Hue. We also discussed urban transportation in Hanoi and Ho Chi Minh City and will set up an experimental bus route in Hanoi. We will recommend that the major ports in France, such as Marseille, dredge such ports as Hai Phong. That is truly an imposing volume of work.

[Ho Quang] At present, Vietnam has an urgent need to modernize the Hanoi-Ho Chi Minh City railroad line. Has France been concerned with that matter? What is France's capability to undertake such a major project?

[Bianco] Of course, this is a priority project. We have reached three decisions: to set up a trial workshop to repair track and locomotives, to study the feasibility of setting up an auto-rail line, and for Vietnam and France to work together in seeking international financial aid. Both nations have their own way of viewing its transportation strategy. The rational ratio of capital invested in developing rail, road, and sea transportation will be determined by the government of Vietnam. The French specialists will provide assistance and conduct feasibility studies.

[Ho Quang] What is the total amount of capital of the agreements that were signed to develop Vietnam's transportation sector?

[Bianco] It is very difficult to give a precise figure because some projects are in the study and drafting phase. But I can say that the estimated total of the projects is many billions of French francs.

[Ho Quang] What is France's ability to contribute financially to those projects?

[Bianco] The projects that have been discussed carefully and can be begun immediately have a value of about 250 million French francs. For example, France will contribute one-third of the capital to build the Gianh River bridge.

I want to add that I have a very good impression of the people and country of Vietnam and I am very optimistic about relations between our two countries.

Professor Views Foreign Investment

932E0027A Hanoi QUAN DOI NHAN DAN
in Vietnamese 19 Sep 92 p 3

[Article by Prof. Nguyen Mai, Ph.D.: "The Tendency of Foreign Investment in Vietnam"]

[Text] If 1991 was regarded as a difficult year economically for Vietnam, the first six months of 1992 were regarded as a period of many important changes, in which clear progress was made in the economic activities.

The rate of increase of the prices of goods and services in June was 0.1 percent, based on the six-month period. After declining steadily between January and April, the gold and dollar prices were stable in August and September. At the beginning of July 1992 the prices of goods and services were about 13 percent higher than in September 1991. That was the lowest rate of increase since 1986. The average monthly rate of price increases during the first six months of 1991 was 4.8 percent. During the first six months of 1992 it was 31 percent. The time when the price level rose at the lowest rate—16.8 percent—was when industrial production increased to the highest level in five years. The fifth month-spring harvest amounted to 9 million tons (in paddy equivalent), an increase of 2.2 million tons over the 1991 fifth month-spring crop.

The signs of an economy gradually stabilizing after many upheavals, oscillations, and challenges have created among investors in Vietnam and foreign businessmen a feeling of greater confidence when investing in economic projects.

During the first six months of 1992 the State Commission on Cooperation and Investment granted authorization for 80 projects with total investment capital of \$717 million, 111 percent of the total at the same time last year. The State Bank issued authorization papers to seven foreign bank branches and one additional joint-venture bank. That was the first time foreign banks—most of them banks with international stature—opened branches in Vietnam. A number of representative banks are about to begin operations in Vietnam. The presence of the banks in a country that still has many unknowns—as they often say—is itself a significant sign of economic activities in general and of direct foreign investment in Vietnam.

In the oil-and-gas sphere, at the end of 1991 the first tracts regarded as having commercial reserves in the continental shelf of Vietnam were auctioned off, with the active participation of many oil-and-gas corporations. After the selection phase was completed, Petro Vietnam signed

contracts with four large oil-and-gas corporations in Holland, Japan, South Korea, and England to explore and develop four of the tracts.

The foreign investment projects are still concentrated in the industrial sector. As in previous years, textiles and ready-made clothing were the sectors with the most projects. The remaining projects were distributed among many sectors: quarrying and processing granite, producing electronic products, mining gold and processing precious stones, producing rubber products, producing spare parts and assembling machinery, producing cement, etc.

In the agricultural sphere, the most notable projects were growing bananas for export, beginning with about 2,000 hectares and later expanding to 15,000 hectares, and projects to unwind silk cocoons, weave silk, and process tea. The tourism-hotel sector, which had already attracted many foreign investors, gained 10 new projects, including a large project, with investment capital of \$70 million, to build sports fields and hotels.

Vietnam is in an area in which many countries have development rates that are among the highest in the world. It is also an area in which there is competition in attracting foreign investment capital. Vietnam's Foreign Investment Law was promulgated at the end of 1987. At that time, the principal provisions of that law were regarded as attractive, and foreigners evaluated it as being the most generous investment law. Five years have past, the world has undergone many changes, and the number of countries joining the ranks of those appealing for investment capital is greater than in the past. The provisions of the foreign investment laws of some countries appear more attractive than those of Vietnam. Therefore, studying to amend and supplement the laws and regulations has become a permanent concern of the state organs, above all the State Commission on Cooperation and Investment. On the basis of the opinions of the foreign investors, in three separate meetings in Hanoi, Nha Trang, and Hau Giang in October 1991, and on the experiences during more than four years of implementing the Foreign Investment Law in Vietnam, a number of stipulations were changed and some other matters are now being studied. During the first six months of the year, the Council of State promulgated the "Law on Entry and Exit Visas, Residence, and Travel by Foreigners in Vietnam" to contribute to implementing the state policy

on friendly and cooperative relations with foreign countries and adjusted the tax rate on people with high incomes, which benefited foreigners and Vietnamese working in enterprises with foreign investment capital. The Ministry of Labor decided to apply a minimum salary of 35 dollars a month in Hanoi and Ho Chi Minh City and 30 dollars a month in the other localities, instead of the previous rate of 50 dollars a month. Those steps both manifest the respect of Vietnam's state organs for the rational recommendations of foreign investors and create a favorable environment that is more attractive to them.

The State Commission on Cooperation and Investment received recommendations from businessmen all over the country regarding about 1,000 foreign investment projects and after a strict selection process 548 projects were included on a list from which foreign investors could select. They were feasible projects in which Vietnamese counterparts were already in existence and the feasibility of which had been considered carefully by the localities and ministries. A complete collection of legal documents relevant to foreign investment activities in Vietnam has been published in English and translations in Japanese, French, German, and Chinese will be published in the future. A guidance booklet of 100 questions and answers that was published in 1992 has provided investors the necessary guidance regarding laws, the procedures for beginning projects, and investment opportunities in Vietnam.

There are still many things that must be done to reduce the situation of bureaucratism and slowness in approving projects, processing export-import paperwork, sponsorship, opening bank accounts, exiting and entering the country, and customs inspections. Those are problems that will be resolved in the future.


While more and more foreigners are coming to Vietnam and the number of people with good will toward mutually beneficial long-range cooperation is also increasing, illegal activities, blackmarketing, and swindling have been condemned not only by the Vietnamese side but also by the genuine foreign investors.

Increasing the effectiveness of laws has always been an urgent requirement of the economy in general and of foreign investment activities in Vietnam specifically.

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